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Abstract 
 
The dissertation is a study of the current international security regime in the 
intermodal transportation system. The new trend of the terrorist action by using the 
transportation unit, gives red warning to address the security weaknesses in the 
transportation system. Container shipping is very essential intermodal transport for 
the world economy. The container will pass through different modes of 
transportation and different security control measures, some of which under the 
international regime represented in ISPS Code in the maritime transport sector and 
others under the national security transport regulation for each country.  
 
The main objectives of this study is first to identify the historical background of 
maritime criminals and national/international assessment of specific risks caused by 
terrorists using the transportation chain as well as the security weaknesses in the 
transport system from the point of origin to the final destination; secondly, to 
examine the effectiveness of the current security measures under the international 
umbrella to provide ship and port facilities security and the development of the 
security framework between countries with mutual commercial interests as 
additional measures to the (ISPS) Code. Then to the benefits and impact of 
increasing levels of security on a state’s economy, shipping actors are examined. 
The final objective is to provide transport authorities by proper information to make 
meaningful decisions on the establishment of a proper security framework. 
 
A brief look is taken at current maritime crimes, including the vulnerability of possible 
terrorist attacks using intermodal transportation facilities or the container itself for 
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that purposes. The role of transportation authorities´, stakeholders´, decision 
makers´, and security experts’ opinions in the container shipping is discussed. 
The concluding chapters provide a decision maker with clear view of current security 
problems in order to be able to take careful decisions that may improve security and 
management control through the container transport chain.  
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Intermodal transportation; Assessment; ISPS Compliance; 
Economic Impacts; Shipping Actors; Container Security; 
Terrorist; Transportation Authorities. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Scope and objectives  
  
Trade is the lifeblood of every nation and it is the most important medium for the 
transfer of technology and transportation of goods from one country to another. At 
the present time, the world is facing a new kind of terrorism and the security of 
global trade is indispensable to prevent terrorism. The systems and processes 
involved in the intermodal transport chain, which includes ocean shipping, should be 
reviewed and analysed in terms of the emerging security regime, particularly in the 
international maritime field and every effort should be expended to ensure that the 
shipping and related industries are protected from any kind of terrorist attack. 
 
The events of 11 September 2001 signalled a red warning light pointing to the 
formidable dangers facing the maritime transportation system, especially the 
weaknesses in various stages of the transport chain. Since time immemorial, 
different types of maritime criminal acts have prevailed including theft of goods, 
drugs and smuggling of cargo, latent targeting of dangerous cargo, piracy and other 
illegal activities. The shipping industry now faces new types of attacks through the 
use of transport facilities as weapons against other countries. Millions of packages 
of hazardous and radioactive materials for the purpose of agriculture, medicine, 
research and manufacturing are transported annually by ships, especially container 
vessels, in addition to the huge amount of oil transported by sea. The methodologies 
used previously in different types of crimes show that the possibility of terrorist acts 
against shipping and countries by the use of materials described above as well as 
other kinds of materials also exists.      
 
The reactions of countries have differed widely. The most important response of the 
international community was the adoption by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) in December 2002 of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
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Code to establish a new mechanism for developing minimum standards of security 
requirements with a strong communication system that has been incorporated as 
chapter XI-2 to the Safety Of Life At Sea convention (SOLAS). The ISPS Code 
came into force on 1 July 2004. For State parties to SOLAS, this represents a major 
defensive tool for their ships, territories and ports. 
 
Some countries such as the USA and certain European countries have enhanced 
their defensive positions in addition to the ISPS Code to ensure maximum security 
for their territories. This new strategy implemented in their domestic rules is 
designed to ensure the safety of cargo from its point and port of origin. The 
container security initiative proposed by the USA to promote scanning and tracking 
of containers is a good example of a sound national security framework. However, 
this framework cannot achieve its aims without the acceptance and cooperation of 
other countries with mutual commercial interests.  Therefore, the World Custom 
Organization (WCO) is pushing to internationalize this program. It has been 
accepted by most of the countries that are members of this organization through the 
signing of a cooperation agreement to implement the framework in their domestic 
rules.  
 
This agreement gives an indication of further improvement in the maritime security 
system that may become the international security strategy for ships and port 
facilities, especially in the container-shipping arena. It is considered to be a vital 
process for the transportation of dangerous, nuclear and radioactive materials. 
 
Decision makers in each country should be aware of all the aspects of the new 
security framework in order to deal with it and to make appropriate decisions. They 
should be able to set a National Security Maritime Transportation Plan for each 
country by managing the different types of risks to prevent any illegal transportation 
of weapons or use of ships as vehicles of mass destruction against target countries. 
 
In conclusion, to ensure maximum security for the shipping transportation system a 
global agreements is needed to the international security frame work by effective 
implementation of the ISPS Code and providing advanced security measures by 
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studying the national framework that may help the decision-maker to improve the 
security standards for each country which help improve international maritime 
security against any kind of terrorism attacks. 
 
The objectives of this study are:  
• to identify the historical background of maritime criminal and 
national/international assessment of specific risks caused by terrorists using 
the transportation chain,  
• to identify security weaknesses in the transport system from the point of 
origin to the final destination,  
• to examine the effectiveness of the current security measures under the 
international umbrella to provide ship and port facilities security,  
• to examine the development of the security framework between countries 
with mutual commercial interests as additional measures to the (ISPS) Code, 
• to examine the benefits and impact of increasing levels of security on a 
state’s economy, shipping companies and the customer, 
• to facilitate transport authorities to make meaningful decisions on the 
establishment of a proper security framework. 
 
The research focuses on these objectives and is based on analysing the status of 
the international transport framework. It highlights container security issues and their 
potential impact, and seeks to determine the appropriate methodology to ensure 
maximum security for the shipping transport chain, as well as the possibility to 
introduce this framework in the current regime. The findings of the research will 
provide a comprehensive overview of security for the transport authorities and 
decision-makers, which will help them, take sound decisions. 
           
1.2. Intermodal transportation and terrorist threats 
 
Intermodal transportation is a system using two or more transport modes during a 
single journey and container transportation is a typical example for that system. The 
system covers all transportation requirements from the point of origin to the final 
destination. This requirement includes documentation process, transportation 
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facilities, customs procedures, safety standards, and security measures. However, 
security of the intermodal transportation chain is extremely difficult because the 
system is complex and not covered by a single transport framework. In case of 
container transport, while the outer edges (land or inland water way) are cover by 
domestic rules of both the export and import countries, the maritime sector (ports, 
ships, shippers, shipping companies) is covered by international regime through 
IMO codes and conventions. Therefore, a discussion through this study will be 
carried out to examine the availability to cover the intermodal transportation system 
in terms of container transportation against terrorist attacks.  
 
Transport systems have become a potential target of terrorist attacks. This was 
shown on September 11, 2001 in the USA and further highlighted by the rail and 
public transport bombing in Moscow and Madrid. Then it tremendously increased in 
July 7, 2005 in another public transport bombing in London during the rush hour 
(Sweet, 2006). According to latest news form Scotland Yard that 21 persons are 
arrested at Heathrow Airport in London, on August 10, 2006, were planning to blow 
up as many as 10 jets leaving Britain to the U.S (Scotland Yard, 2006). Considering 
these crises against the industrialized world, ensuring that supply chain is not used 
to transport terrorist goods, as weapon of mass destruction is a matter of security 
measures.  
 
Some incidents give red warning for the vulnerability of terrorist attacks against the 
shipping industry. In Panguil Bay 2000, the bombing on board the Ro-Ro ferry Our 
Lady of Mediatrix caused death of 40 and injury of 50 people. The same year, 
another 19 people died and 37 were hurt in the bombing of the American warship 
Cole.  In October 2002 a new attack in the Gulf of Aden by bombing the oil tanker 
Limburg resulted in the death of one person on board and 90,000 barrels polluting 
the sea. The aim of terrorists is to cause death and destruction of the human lives, 
the environment, and commerce (Mukherjee & Mejia, 2003). This crisis gives an 
indication of the great challenges facing governments, particularly the transportation 
authority to protect their territories against those criminals. Actions should be taken 
to design a security framework and ensure maximum protection to the transport 
modes. 
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In the maritime sector “What September 11 has done is to intensity focus on this 
issue and present the IMO with the challenge of deterring perceived threat to 
maritime security through proactive measures and new instruments” (Mejia, 2002, 
p.27). However, intermodal system is not only maritime transport, but also include 
other modes of transport inside the countries´ territories. Therefore, another 
proactive measure should be taken by the United Nations to cover the gaps of the 
intermodal transportation system that may appear in the outer edges of the system. 
 
1.3. The role of the transportation authorities 
 
Intermodal transportation is a hybrid system connecting different modes of freight 
transport. Transportation authorities´ role inflate from their responsibility for 
providing a safety environment to those people living in the country or using the 
entire public transport system. Further, the authorities’ responsibilities extend to 
promoting the nation’s benefit, enhancing national security, and protecting public 
interests. While governmental authorities are involved in setting the rules and 
regulations, some sectors within the transportation modes are operate by private 
entities (Sweet, 2005. p.9). 
 
For example, the private industry owns and operates a huge portion of the 
transportation system, such as pipeline companies, railroad companies, passenger 
air carriers, and motor carriers for freight and passenger. Moreover, the local 
governments are owned and operate the transportation infrastructure within each 
state, such as highways, transit systems, and local airports. So, they implement 
regulations for different sectors of the transportation system and provide security 
services in their area of transport. The federal governments include the ministry of 
transport responsible for setting standards, issuing regulations, establishing policies, 
and managing financial targets, such as taxes and budgets for the different modes 
of transportation (United States General Accounting Office, GAO, 2003). Therefore, 
to ensure an integrated security system through national territory, cooperation must 
take place between the government and the private industry to continually re-
evaluate security measures. 
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The ministry of transport is the national government’s agency, which is concerned 
with all intermodal transport problems including security issues for various reasons. 
Ministries are among those first responding authorities to the crises; they are the 
authorized entity for the transport regulatory oversight and licensing of transport 
companies, operators, and vehicles. They also govern the carries´ rules of transport 
fright and passenger, and they play an important role in improving information 
technology, which is the key of transparency and communication of information 
among different modes and different actors in the transportation chain (OECD, 2005, 
p.21). 
 
The government regulations are the key issue that could affect the efficiency of the 
domestic and international transportation system. These regulations may affect the 
requirements for tightening security measures, distribution and expanding of 
populations, improving the industry, enlarging urban centres, and changing 
capacities and requesting of various modes of transportation. However, recently 
some unavoidable factors may affect the role of governments to set or deregulate 
their system, such as the current terrorist attacks by using transportation facilities 
which requires all the nation’s authorities to continue accurate assessment of the 
threats (Sweet, 2005, p.9). 
 
1.4. Structure and organization 
 
This discussion will begin with vulnerability of intermodal transportation in terms of 
the container industry using risk management assessment and relevant scenario to 
identify the gaps through the various modes of transportation. The assessment will 
include the effect of the decision makers to cover the gaps, weaknesses 
identification on the outer edges (land & inland waterway), and the maritime sector 
including port area, ships, and shipping actors. Examination of the effectiveness of 
the ISPS Code to cover these gaps will be carried out.  
 
Then, the current initiatives and responses, which have already been taken over the 
last few years will be introduced and their approach to the overall solution from the 
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technological point of view, will be described. Examination of the effectiveness of the 
new security measures to cover the gaps in the container transportation and the 
possibility to emerge these initiatives in the international regime will be introduced. 
 
Finally, there will be a study of economic consideration to implement the different 
security measures including ISPS Code and container initiatives. A cost benefit 
analysis and a possible answer to the question, “Who will pay for this security?” will 
be introduced. The study will include the economic impacts for certain countries 
such as the developing countries and shipping actors due to these new measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Shipping transportation across modes 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The study through this chapter provides an inclusive examination of the intermodal 
security framework for different types of transportation with emphasis on the 
container transportation chain through risk assessment of each mode to identify 
where the vulnerabilities estimated along the supply chain including the 
effectiveness of the only current international regime, the ISPS Code, to cover the 
security of maritime sector. 
 
The most tangible chain from a security point of view is the substantial movement of 
freight from point to point and from one mode to another. Intermodal Transportation 
Network is a logistically linked system using two or more transport modes with a 
single rate. Modes are having common handling characteristics, permitting freight 
(or people) to be transferred between modes during a movement between an origin 
and a destination. In other words and according to the Merriam Webster Dictionary 
the system is defined as “Being or involving transportation by more than one form of 
carriers during the single journey” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2005). The essence 
of efficient intermodal transport is to choose the most suitable modes to achieve 
operational and cost effective delivery of cargo, putting into consideration the 
frequently of the service, availability of facilities, presence of other alternatives, 
speed of delivery and security consideration (Lowe, 2005, p 1).  
 
The container transport system is a typically intermodal system, which is carried by 
maritime and inland waterway, road and rail operators. This system could provide 
high safety and efficient delivery of global goods transport through different modes. 
The significance of the containerization basis on that small steel box could carry all 
different types of cargo including gas, liquid, chemical, reefer, and dangerous goods 
in package form and bulk cargo. The containers are not limited to use inside the 
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transportation modes but can also be found anywhere from major ports and cities to 
small side streets. However, it is very difficult to address security of the container 
transport chain because a single transport framework does not cover the system. 
The different interests of industrial operators, which affect the security level from one 
node to another, affect the system infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 1: security coverage for intermodal transportation chain. (Source OECD, 2003, p. 50) 
 
A comprehensive security intermodal framework is required to secure the container 
transport chain from the point of origin to the point of destination. Whereas the 
central part of the system is covered in ports and the maritime transport sector by an 
international security framework which exists through the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (ISPS) which entered into force on 1 July 2004 as Chapter XI-
2 of the SOLAS Convention, the outer edges of the chain such as land and inland 
waterways are not yet covered by an equivalent framework except some individual 
efforts from some countries to conclude cooperation agreements to cover some 
elements of the security breaches in those areas such as the Container Security 
Initiatives (CSI) by the USA, container stuffing and seal management guidelines by 
World Custom Organization (WCO), EU Freight Security Directive and some other 
initiatives which will be covered in details in the next chapter of this study 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development( OECD), 2005, p. 12).  
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The risk of security breaches at any point of the transportation links will affect all the 
other links of the intermodal transportation chain. The level of security varies from 
point to point and from one mode to another, and also from country to country. One 
should estimate the risks associated with all cargo types, especially cargo which is 
vulnerable by nature such as the container, which is being used to deliver Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. International action to 
strengthen the security of the container transport chain is actually needed.  It is also 
important to increase awareness of how to identify the weaknesses and cover the 
gaps in and between the transportation modes where terrorists may act (OECD, 
2003). 
 
2.2. General Background of Container Intermodalism  
 
Containerization permits the mechanized handling of cargoes of varied types and 
dimensions that are placed into boxes of standard dimensions. The International 
Standards Organization (ISO) in reference sizes standardizes the dimensions of the 
containers. One of the major sizes is Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) with 
dimensions of 20 feet long, 8 feet high and 8 feet wide, and with a permissible load 
of 22 tons. The other major size is the Forty-foot Equivalent unit with dimensions of 
40 feet long, 8 feet high and 8 feet wide, and with a permissible load of 32 tons. In 
this way goods that might have taken days to be loaded or unloaded from a ship or 
other transportation mode can now be handled in a matter of minutes. The maritime 
fleet are now exceeding the number of 2700 modular container ships and the 
emergence of a global network of several hundred highly automated port handling 
facilities (OECD, 2005, p. 24).  
 
Each year about 2 million TEUs worth of containers are manufactured that may 
make the number of the global containers 21 million TEUs in 2005. The use of 
containers shows the integration between freight transportation modes by offering a 
higher fluidity to cargo movements and standardization of loads (Rodrigue, et.al, 
2004). The Bureau International des Containers (BIC) indicates that about 15 million 
TEUs were circulated world wide in 2002. The world shipping council indicates that 
17 million TEUs were circulated in 2003.  These figures indicate the huge volume of 
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container movements around the world and it is expected to increase in the coming 
years as world trade increases (OECD, 2005, p.24).  The security of the container 
transportation chain is a matter of importance due to its popularity and its great 
importance to the world trade system.  
 
2.3. Capability of the Global Container Supply Chain 
 
The ability of the supply chain to successful deliver cargo depends on its efficiency 
and security level, which is represented by five capabilities: 
- Efficiency. The container intermodal system has the exclusive advantage of 
its ability to deliver goods faster and cheaper than any other types of 
transportation, taking into consideration the value of the cargo in terms of its 
weight and volume. 
- Shipment reliability. The system should provide the minimum amount of 
cargo loss by theft or accidents due to the high level of protection inside this 
steel box. 
- Shipment transparency.  The goods transported through the system 
should be legitimately represented to authorities and pass through a legal 
and authorized regime which prevents any kind of illegal transportation.  
- Fault tolerance. The system should be able to react to disturbance and 
failures by isolating the damaged part without any further fatigue in the 
entire system.  
- Resilience. The system should be able and designed to go back quickly to 
normal operating conditions after any loss or damage to one or more of its 
mechanisms. 
 
The first three of these capabilities are functions of the container shipping system. 
The final two, resilience and tolerance, are system properties which react with 
normal or international turbulence. 
 
While all these capabilities are interconnected together, they need to be evaluated 
through different metric measures. Gains or losses in any one capability must be 
assessed against the result of gains or losses in the others.  The efficiency, 
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capability and security of the system may be achieved under normal circumstances 
and normal operation conditions, but this will be in conflict with the emergency 
situation, especially with such kind of loss of life or unprepared emergency 
responding plan for the different modes. For instance, security and investment will 
be against each other in terms of increasing inspection, which may improve security, 
level but increases time delay in ports. This requires the decision maker to design 
the security policy and technology with respect to those capabilities to avoid conflict 
(Willis & Ortiz, 2004, p. 16).   
 
2.4. The Transport Security Risks 
 
The efficient assessment of the transport security risks is based on the identification 
and assessment of a full range of foreseen possible terrorist intervention scenarios. 
The security risk is based on the possibility of a transportation crime including 
terrorism compared to its level of protection and the consequences of a successful 
attack including the level of fatalities and economic impact. The transport security 
risks may be categorized into two main types. 
- Infrastructure risks, which are one aim of the terrorists to disturb and destroy, 
e.g., the transportation supplies chain risks. Many areas are considered as 
high risks and are directly linked to a transport element which the terrorists 
may target such as rail/road tunnels or bridges, rail/ road/ ports terminals, 
waterways and ships locks. 
- Supply chain risks.  The other aim of terrorist is to use the supply chain to 
transport their illegal weapons or use it as a weapon of mass destruction                            
to create fatigue in the entire country infrastructure. The cargo on the 
transport units will pass through key areas such as industrial locations and 
heavily populated areas. During this trip, it is an easy task for the terrorists to 
locate any kind of destruction weapon adjusted by timer to destroy the 
transport unit, create losses in human lives and affect the country’s economy. 
Further damage will be tremendously high if the cargo is dangerous such as 
toxic chemicals and any flammable gases or liquids (Mackenbach & Coolen, 
2005, p. 2). 
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More specific, these types of risk analysis have limitations when dealing with 
terrorism. A common approach to dealing with this type of uncertainty problem is to 
seek out situations of vulnerability and develop scenarios that can reduce this 
vulnerability or that may provide flexibility if there are attacks on vulnerable points. 
Containers, for example, would seem to be a vulnerable link in the security network 
because of their number, nature and continual movement, although they have not 
yet been used as a means of attack. Reducing this vulnerability is a matter of 
expectation and a significant degree of subjectivity and 'expert opinion' is certainly 
involved to create possible scenarios to the threat, which may help the 
transportation authority to adapt security measures (Brooks & Button, 2006, p. 100).  
 
2.5. Fundamental Container Risk Measures  
 
According to the opinion of the experts of the European Conference of Ministers and 
Transport in an OECD report in 2005, there are two approaches to specify security 
measures for the container transport chain. The first is “hijack scenario” which 
shows the possibility of terrorists to intercept a legitimate consignment and tamper 
with it. The second is “Trojan horse scenario” which assumes and/or develops a 
legal trading identity to load an illegal and dangerous shipment.  
 
These techniques were earlier used by criminals to smuggle drugs, illegal imports 
and for criminal purposes while they can now also be used as potential “modus 
operandi” of terrorists with more organized methods whereby they can access the 
container without leaving visible traces as expert criminals. Their first priority is to 
ensure that their illegal consignment gets to the final consignee unnoticed and 
untouched while they are interested in removing the contents of the container in 
such way to avoid, or at least delay, discovery of their action.    
 
2.5.1 Container Hijack 
 
Hijacking the container is insertion or placement of an illegal consignment within a 
container by targeting a legitimate container and accessing its contents at any 
security weak step during its voyage and hides the illegal consignment inside, and 
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then they re-seal and re-insert it back into the legitimate trade flow. This way is used 
without the knowledge of all the responsible parties in the container transport chain.  
 
When the freight is placed on trucks or trains, for various periods of time and moves 
to ports to be shipped on board vessels, it will pass through different traffic 
conditions in which it is within the capacity of terrorist organizations to insert a mass 
of smaller explosives in the supply chain or in the cargo itself. For example, if a 
container is loaded with some kind of bagged cargo, it will be stowed inside the 
container on pallets, so breaking the seal and hiding the explosives between the 
bags and returning the seal again to the original condition could access the contents 
of the container. This will be easy when the cargo is not moving at the transfer 
points such as loading and storage facilities. Randomly, the explosions may occur at 
industrial areas, population areas, dense traffic, critical infrastructures, transfer 
points, and distribution centres. Furthermore, the supply chain will grind to a halt to 
allow inspection of all cargo (Mackenbach & Coolen, 2005, p. 34). 
 
 
Figure 2: The two fundamentally possible scenarios to use container in terrorist threat. 
          (Source: OECD, 2005 (container transport security across modes) 
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2.5.2 “Trojan Horse Scenario”  
 
The Trojan horse is the second technique used by terrorist organizations, which 
depend on setting up or purchasing staffing inside the legitimate trading companies 
that allow the criminals to achieve their illegal purpose through the normal trade 
patterns. Those stuffing may belong to cargo warehouses, managers, forwarders 
and even Customs. The buyer may also involve this scenario as a part of a hiding 
terrorist organization or work belonging to “Trojan horse” shippers.  The expert 
terrorists consider this way as more effective than “hijacking container” perhaps 
because it is easier and more-cost effective to use the knowledgeable staff involved 
the transportation chain than to use their skills (OECD, 2005). 
 
Generally, it is very difficult to know whether the targeted container is “hijacked” or 
“Trojan horse”, but after September 11 when the world started to take additional 
security measures especially in the supply chain the most possible method to use by 
terrorists is “Trojan horse”. For example, the Chief Security Officer at Hutchison Port 
in the USA, which is considered one of the largest container terminals in the world (it 
handled 42 million containers from 35 ports in 2003) said, “Each of the 42 million 
containers that went through our facilities around the globe was a Trojan Horse. We 
don’t have the ability to truly know if the containers have been tampered with”. He 
stated that the modern society is greatly dependent on the efficient, reliable and 
cost-effective movement of goods through this supply chain, and it’s clear that the 
risks involved in securing the goods are huge (Gilbert, 2005, p. 3).   
 
2.6. Stowaways and the Effectiveness of the ISPS Code  
 
Illegal immigration or stowaways are a major international problem, which 
represents the security breaches and fatigues in the implementation of the ISPS 
code in many countries, especially those countries suffering from political or 
economic problems. With the significant awareness of international port security 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. IMO defined a stowaway as, “a 
person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is subsequently loaded on the 
ship, without the consent of the ship owner or the master or by any other 
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responsible person and who is detected on board after the ship has sailed, and is 
declared as a stowaway by the master to the appropriate authorities” (Ref, IMO 
DOC. FAL 29/4) The problem is that some of those stowaways pose criminal 
elements such as trading in illegal drugs or supporting other criminals to facilitate 
the movement of illegal materials related to terrorist organizations. 
 
Table 1: Stowaways cases reports, ships involved in stowaways’ incident.  
(Source: www.intertanko.com) 
 
2003 2004
Flag Number of cases Number of cases
Algeria 1 0
Antigua and Barbuda 7 0
Bahamas 31 19
China 0 1
Croada 1 0
Cypois 25 20
Denmark 22 2
Egypl 1 1
Estonia 1 0
France 2 1
Germany 4 1
Greece 4 3
Hong Kong, China 5 3
llaly 7 4
Liberta 25 15
Luxembourg 1 0
Malla 3 3
Marshall Islands 1 0
Morocco 2 0
Netherlands 2 2
Netheriands, Antilles 10 2
Norway 5 3
Panamá 10 11
Portugal 1 0
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
2 2
Singapore 1 0
Spain 0 1
Sweden 2 1
Switzerland 1
Turkey 3 1
United Kingdom 2 0
United Kingdom (Bemnuda) 0 1
United Kingdom (Isle of Man) 1 1
Total 183 98
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Regarding the volume of stowaways problem, the statistics prepared by 
INTERTANKO according to IMO reports show that the incidents during 2003 and 
2004 related to the total number of the stowaways decreased from 183 cases in 
2003 to 98 cases in 2004, which represents the starting point of the effective 
additional security measures taken directly after the ISPS Code came into force 
owing to strict accessibility into the port area and the proper implementation of 
measures on board vessels.  For example, table 1 shows the number of stowaways 
on board vessels flying Denmark flag decreased tremendously from 22 cases in 
2003 to only 2 cases in 2004, while the number of stowaways remained the same or 
increased in percentage on board the vessels flying Panama, Liberia, Cyprus and 
Bahamas flags. Most of the embarkation into vessels in 2004 was in West Africa: 
56%, also the Mediterranean, black sea and North Sea: 34%.  Most of these cases 
are reported in container, general cargo and RORO vessels, but the number is 
decreasing in container and general cargo while it is increasing in RORO vessels 
(INTERTANKO, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 3: places of stowaways’ embarkation vessels by region in 2004.  
(Source: www.intertanko.com) 
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Another example comes to the screen when the Associated Press news agency in 
USA announced on the fifth of April, 2006, that twenty two persons including four 
women expected to be Chinese were taken in custody after they apparently let 
themselves out of a 40-foot container that had been used to smuggle them from 
China on board container vessel Rotterdam. The container was loaded in Shanghai 
and stayed on board for 15 days before it was discharged in Seattle Port in the USA 
and stowed in the storage terminal area where the security guards found some of 
the stowaways out of the container. The spokesman for U.S Customs and Border 
Protection, Michael Milne, said that “this container had been flagged for special 
examination, but the examination had not been conducted before the group was 
caught” (KUTV, News, 2006). 
Recognition of the stowaways’ problem gives great awareness of the terrorist 
problem due to the accessibility to the port area and weak implementation of the 
ISPS Code. The stowaways have a great impact on the ship-owner once they are 
discovered on board and the master announces that. The vessel will face a lot of 
problems when entering any port, which may delay the vessel and have an adverse 
economic impact on the ship-owner or the charterer.  Additionally this vessel will be 
considered not compiling with the requirements of the ISPS Code and will be 
subjected to further inspection and further security control measures. However, the 
ship-owner blames the port authority that his vessels are not safe while berthing and 
that those illegal immigrant persons were able to access the port through the port 
borders.  
“Regardless of the efforts made by ship-owners to control access to their vessels in 
port, the task of securing port facilities is a much more complex operation and one 
which many ports will find difficult to achieve”, says risk-management executive 
Tony Baker in North of England P&I.  He also added that “North of England points 
out that despite the introduction of IMO guidelines on prevention of stowaways in the 
2002 amendments to the Convention on Facilitation of Maritime Traffic (FAL 
Convention), port security in many parts of the world remains extremely lax. 'It 
remains to be seen whether the ISPS Code will improve the situation”.  More 
security measures and more effective implementation of the ISPS Code, 
cooperation and communication between governments, ports and the shipping 
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industry are important.  Strict access to port facilities, containers and ships is 
essential (North of England P&I Club, 2004). 
 
2.7. Transportation Authority assessment 
 
The national governments normally hold the overall security policy for the 
transportation chain. At the same time, regional and local authorities promote a 
significant responsibility of the transport infrastructure such as railroad, inland 
waterways, motorways and ports. Clear definition of the role and responsibilities at 
all levels in the government is essential to avoid any conflict and to respond 
effectively and efficiently to crisis situations and ensure maximum protection from 
terrorist activity across transportation modes (OECD, 2004, P. 51). 
 
The intermodal transport system is integrated.  Danger occurs when the transport 
unit moves from one place to another, which makes security complicated because 
any weaknesses of the security level in one mode will affect all the other links and 
the risk may transfer from the weak node to the other nodes.  Therefore, if there is 
any security concern relating to the use of maritime shipping, they should also be 
common to all other modes and any authorized persons will take the decision in 
each responsible organization.  Many of the breaches in the security level will start 
from the top manager and they are common for all the modes.  
 
The main feature of intermodal land and maritime transportation is that the system is 
open to the users. Any person can access the system to know some information 
about passenger trip schedules and places to go to or get information about 
schedules of vessels’ arrivals at ports; one may also get information about the type 
of cargo on board those vessels, discharging sequence, and storage area position 
located in port.  The documentation system, such as bill of lading or cargo manifest 
or passenger list, should be secure.  The Internet and announced media as well 
make it easy to help the costumers know every thing about their cargo or 
passengers’ relatives. However, this is also against the security measures because 
the terrorist groups could use this information also to plan for attacking this 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, the additional security measures to restrict the flow of this 
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information or passenger and cargo movement may create commercial impact on 
the operators and bad consequences for the customers (United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO), 2003). 
 
The transportation chain is interconnected through various means of transportation 
facilities including railways, trucking, buses, barges and seagoing ships. All modes 
work in harmony to facilitate the movement of billions of passengers and million tons 
of freight beyond the countries borders. This kind of complex connection and size 
makes this intermodal system difficult to be adequately secured. At the same time, 
the meeting of all modes in one place, such as ports, makes ports potential targets 
for terrorist attacks due to the presence of passengers, employers, equipment and 
cargo which may contain some kind of hazardous materials such as biological, 
nuclear, and radioactive substances (GAO, 2003). 
 
Additionally, the difficulty to secure the system may increase in terms of the decision 
maker level when the system is divided into public and private transportation 
operators. The tremendous difference of the stakeholders’ interests will affect the 
security decision, where some operators carry passengers only, others carry freight 
only and others carry both. There are stakeholders who represent the government 
and others who are individuals. A number of operators invest millions of dollars, and 
others invest limited sums but their deficiencies will affect the security of the system 
(GAO, 2003). 
 
The conflict of the stakeholders’ interests may create some kind of security 
weaknesses when some parties try to implement the safety standards and others try 
to implement the security measures. For example, the International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code requires shippers to fasten placards on every side 
of the container to show the nature of danger inside this container during the 
transportation period. This will be against the security measures, which may make 
this container an attractive target for the terrorists. 
  
Since the transportation modes depend on one other, the deficiency of the security 
system in one mode will affect the other modes. For example, if a box or container 
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containing weapons of mass destruction is discharged from one vessel in port to a 
train or truck, and this train or truck moves outside the port area, then explosion will 
happen. This will affect all the railway or highway systems as a result of a deficiency 
in the maritime mode (GAO, 2003). 
 
Other points of weakness could arise when an accident occurs in the train or truck 
within the port area where the security regulations will be under the supervision of 
two or more of the government departments such as coastguard, land transportation 
authorities and port authority. Confusion may affect the law enforcement bodies 
where every party moves forward to enforce security measures. 
 
2.8. Outer Edges Assessment through Intermodal Network  
 
The outer edges of the intermodal system lie in two different countries where there 
are different security regulations to control the movement of goods. At the first point, 
millions of shippers introduce the service for thousands of intermediaries to organize 
and ship their cargoes to hundreds of ports through maritime carriers. At the other 
end, the system works in the opposite way gradually moving towards great messy 
networks where millions of receivers deliver their cargoes. With every step the flow 
of cargo, especially containers, becomes denser and the overall visibility of the 
system becomes greater (OECD, 2005, p. 25).  
 
In addition, the international regime will be applied by all the country members of the 
IMO and who implement the ISPS Code. The weaknesses here come from those 
countries, which did not ratify the Code or did not implement the system into their 
national legislation in a good manner. The transportation unit passing from the land 
or inland waterway area which has security breaches to the port area will decrease 
the effectiveness of the ISPS Code to secure the port and ships, especially with the 
container that is normally loaded and sealed in the land sector before it reaches the 
port area.     
 
The supply chain is a potential target to terrorist attacks while the railroads and 
trucking system become the principal means of domestic and international 
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transportation to many nations. They have great commercial importance to the 
landlocked countries, which are the main connection between them, and maritime 
countries to transfer their cargoes by sea. The high-speed trains provide 
transportation time equal to flight time, particularly in Europe and Japan. Railroads 
and trucks must participate with maritime shipping which is considered the effective 
means of land transportation to bulk cargo such as coal and grain, ore, and 
chemical in bulk form such as sulphur and phosphate; and some cargoes which are 
sensitive to the rain water such as hazardous materials which become dangerous 
when wet and most of the steel products (Sweet, 2006, pp. 23 - 24).  
 
The container point of origin is a shipper premises where the container will be 
stuffed and sealed. The cargo after stuffed inside the container become only 
information on the paper prepared by the shipper and transmitted to all concerning 
parties. Consequently, the other parties such as land or ocean carriers have there 
knowledge about the container contents only from this paper which called cargo 
manifest. Accordingly, if there is possibility to interfere the container contents, as 
Trojan horse, it will be during packaging time and then the container will continue its 
legitimate journey without discovery to what are its real contents. Security of the 
container will also start from shipper point through sealing and tracking system, 
which it will discuss far and wide in the next chapter. Therefore, shippers or other 
parties packing a container are the most important link in the container security 
chain.          
 
2.9. Maritime sector assessment  
2.9.1. Why Is the Maritime Sector a Target for the Terrorist Attacks? 
 
Shipping remains the main mode of transportation. The port facilities and maritime 
infrastructure play an important role in trade and economy for each country by 
providing profits from the maritime investment, tax revenues, jobs, and providing 
supplies to the other industries.  The maritime industry is a rich area in nature for 
several criminal acts starting from the old piracy and cargo theft in the seventeenth 
century up to the currently probable use of maritime shipping for smuggling illegal 
cargo or using the ship itself as a weapon of mass destruction.   
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The maritime industry infrastructure depends on the construction, maintenance, and 
use of ports and canals worldwide. Ports are a vital part of the industry which 
consists of two main components: port facilities including cargo handling equipment, 
reception facilities, warehousing and terminals and harbour work including pilot 
activities and vessel reception / departure procedures. All commodities, including 
petroleum, chemical, biological and raw materials, which are necessary for 
medicines, technology and heavy industry, pass through this gate (Sweet, 2006, pp. 
30-32).  
 
The canals are also vital to the world economy, for example the Suez Canal 
connecting the trade between the east and west part of the world. The world 
countries faced economic crises from 1976 to 1973 when the Suez Canal was 
closed to navigation for about sex years due to the war between Egypt and Israel.  
Nowadays a vessel of 150,000 displacements and a draft up to 16 meters could 
transit the canal. The maintenance operations carried out every day will allow 
vessels of draft up 22 meters to transit the Canal in 2010. The Suez Canal authority 
reported that 17,224 vessels passed the Canal during 2003, which is more than 8% 
of the world shipping fleet (Suez Canal authority, 2006).  Another vital canal is the 
Panama Canal, which connects the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean. The size 
of the vessels, which pass the canal, is called Panamax, which is around 65,000 
tons displacements and with a maximum draft of 12 meters. The passage time is 
about 9 hours and 14,011 vessels passed the canal during 2005 (Panama Canal 
Authority, 2006).  
 
2.9.2. Port Assessment  
 
Ports are sea gates and vital to the economic health of each maritime country that is 
considered one of the main parts in the intermodal transportation system. World 
ports vary in size and complexity and use a mixture of modes of transportation.  The 
port area is an attractive target for terrorist attacks. The estimated economic 
consequences of a successful attack and the resulting shutdown of this system cost 
billions of dollars.  In April 2004, a fast boat filled with explosives attacked the Iraqi 
oil terminal at Basra despite the forceful U.S. security presence. Another example, in 
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May 2004, terrorists fired on workers at the Saudi petrochemical terminal on the Red 
Sea. Other attacks against maritime infrastructure occurred in Nigeria, Colombia 
and Yemen (Poulin, 2005, p.3).  
 
In the port area, there are different types of cargo and passenger terminals, 
chemical factories, oil refineries, power plants; dangerous cargo stowage areas and 
other important facilities often located in port areas which add another set of 
possible targets.  The port is a central part in the intermodal transportation system 
where concentrations of cargo and passengers flow and meet at different types of 
transportation points such as container terminals, where containers are transferred 
between ships and railroad cars or trucks to move inside and outside the port area 
as fast as possible.  Roads and railroads crisscross many ports, allowing access by 
land as well as by water.  The number of people working in or travelling through 
ports is in the billions. Port facilities are also used to ship military cargo to support 
nations during wartime. Different types of vessels sail in and out ranging from oil 
tankers and freighters to tugboats, pilot boats and passenger ferries. This huge 
investment in, and structure of, the ports may increase vulnerability of the risk 
factors based on terrorist attacks against any maritime countries (GAO, 2005, p. 22).  
 
Sometimes the container area in the port is classified as a special area due to its 
sensitivity for handling operations, which depends on fast movement of the 
container to minimize its time in port.  At the same time, international minimum 
standards for containers terminal security should be established. Ensuring proper 
sealing of the container is important to protect the container from unauthorized 
access while in port or in a storage facility and ensure that access is restricted only 
to authorized personnel and vehicles. In areas where containers are stored 
temporarily, waiting for shipment or transit, attention must be given to adequate 
fencing, lighting, and access control points. Sufficient numbers of well-trained 
security personnel are needed to carry out routine monitoring and inspections of 
container shipment (Binnendijk, et. al, 2002).    
 
The effectiveness of implementing the International Ship and Port Facilities Security 
(ISPS) Code will affect the level of protection in the ports and on board vessels, 
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which may prevent the transfer of risk from one country to another by sea. The ISPS 
Code introduces to the authorities the basic ways of protecting the port area such as 
implementing the security plans for each port recognizing the nature of the operation 
inside the ports because the risks in one port are different from the risks in another. 
For example, ports that support passenger ferries and container cargo may be 
exposed to different risks than ports that primarily support bulk cargo. The plan must 
also be able to control access to areas containing dangerous goods or hazardous 
substances and restrict access to terminal areas to control access onboard as well 
such as bridges or other control stations critical to the vessels’ operation (GAO, 
2005, p. 22).  
 
However, there is a strong argument whether the ISPS Code is enough to protect 
the maritime sector or not and if it is so, is everything running well to ensure 
effective results from the system? The answer to the first question is already valid 
because the ISPS is not a “cure-all” for the security aliments of the maritime sector, 
but it is a starting point to show the right way and put the entire industry in the same 
direction. The benefit of the international regulations, which control any system, is 
that the entire world will be able to understand the requirements for each country 
and it is easy to find from where the deficiencies started. The answer to the second 
question is considered the principle of the security aim through the ISPS Code. The 
facts indicate that up till now the system is not able to achieve the security for the 
maritime industry. This is because many countries do not comply with the 
regulations inside the port area or on board ships, which makes a weak point in the 
system as is clear from the practices of stowaways, pirates and cargo thieves up till 
now (Billings, 2006, p. 32).  
 
In the USA, the national security strategy takes action through the Department of 
Homeland Security to undertake foreign port assessments and the U.S. Coast 
Guard will be responsible for this function according to its “International Port 
Security Program” objective. This objective is to open discussion with trading 
nations around the world to exchange information and share the best practices to 
align a port security program through the implementation of the ISPS code and other 
international security standards. The aim of the USA of improving the security in the 
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foreign port is to ensure early alarm as soon as possible in the origin ports to any 
danger which may threaten its ports from the visiting ships (Goulielmos & 
Anastasakos, 2005).  The plan is to assess the ports of 135 countries that have 
commercial interests with the USA. The Coast Guards began conducting 
assessments in 2004 to review about 35 ports a year. The vessels coming from non-
complying ports will not be accepted to visit any of the U.S ports or approach its 
territorial waters (Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 2005). 
 
2.9.3. Ship assessment 
 
Ships are the most important point for maritime transportation security system. The 
vessels may be used to transfer dangers to any country through cargo or to be used 
as a weapon in a terrorist strike just as the scenario of aircrafts in September 11, 
2001 against the world trade centre in the USA. For instance, the vessels may be 
used against the population by creating chemical or poisoning pollution near the 
beaches or create explosions in the population centres adjacent to the port area or 
damage the port facilities themselves. The terrorists may also sink the vessels to 
block the harbour entrance and/or shipping channels.  The existence of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, phantom ships, illegal migrants and stowaways 
indicates the existence of security weakness due to improper implementation of the 
ISPS Code on board the vessels.  
 
The studies made by the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) show 
that although the code increased the level of security on board vessels and in port 
areas, the number of armed attacks had not been reduced after the code came into 
force in 2004 and most of the attacks were on the vessels in ports or at anchorage 
areas, which means that some vessels and ports still do not comply with the security 
requirements. For example, the reporting of attacks rose approximately by 8% in the 
first quarter of 2006 (61 attacks) when compared with the same period in 2005 (56 
attacks) (International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy reporting centre, 2006).  
 
The economic consideration for the ship owners to decrease operations costs is an 
important barrier in security implementation. Decreased number of crew and 
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increased fraudulent certificates between officers indicates improper training and 
substandard of security measures as well. That substandard crew are not being able 
to cover the requirements of the ISPS Code. Another barrier is that some Flag 
States are clearly failing in their responsibility to maintain safe manning on board 
their vessels as required by the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certificates and Watch-keeping (STCW).  The ITF survey for the 165,000 seafarers’ 
from Turkish, Greek, Ukrainian, Indonesian, Chinese, Filipino, Latin America, Polish 
and Croatia results indicate that 96% said “there had been no increase in crew 
levels to cope with additional workload required by the code”, especially with the 
vessels operating in short voyage, “it has become impossible to perform the 
requested clerical duties together with the normal duties diligently, efficiently and 
consciously” (Jump, 2006, p. 13).  
 
The control mechanism for ships to ensure the effective implementation of the ISPS 
Code is a subject for Port State Control (PSC). Control is the process of monitoring 
activities to ensure that they are being accomplished as planned, and correcting any 
significant deviations. The basic aim of PSC is to identify sub-standard ships and 
sub-standard flag states as well and promote strict regulations to access the 
international ports as a defensive line against any danger that may affect the 
security and the safety of the shipping industry.  
 
The port state control database of the major regional maritime administrations and 
MOUs such as the Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU, Black Sea MOU and the United State 
Coast Guard (USCG) analyses the successful level of the ISPS implementation, has 
been sharing information and industry co-operation since July 1, 2004, when the 
ISPS entered into force. However, the statistics also give common awareness of 
errors and lapses, which should be identified and avoided to develop a security 
culture in the shipping industry. 
 
The statistical analysis of security deficiency and non-complying ships of the first 
year after the ISPS Code entered into force shows that 2511 ships were detained by 
PSC worldwide for various reasons, of which 259 ships (10.3%) were detained on 
security grounds. The detention rates for each individual region are: the Tokyo MOU 
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4.4%, the Black Sea MOU 6.6%, the Paris MOU 8.7% and the highest rate was the 
USCG 45.7% where most of the detentions were due to security grounds. The 
statistics also show that the security deficiency increases with older ships where 
77.3% of detentions were for ships 15 years old and over. Another important remark 
is that all the security ground detentions were related to the Flags of Convenience 
ships (FOCs) except the Russian Federation and 45% of the overall detentions are 
attributed to 5 flags only where the Panama Flag is the highest among them by 
20.1% (Yilmazel & Asyali, 2005). 
 
Table 2: ISPS non-compliant ships classified by type of ship.  
(Source: http://www.iamu-edu.org/generalassembly/aga6/pdf/s2-yilmazel.pdf ) 
Black Sea  
MOU 
Paris  
MOU 
Tokyo 
MOU 
USCG 
 
TOTAL  
 
Ship’s Type Det . 
 N o 
Rate 
% 
Det. 
No 
Rate 
% 
Det. 
No 
Rate 
% 
Det. 
No 
Rate 
% 
Det. 
No 
Rate 
% 
General Dry 
Cargo Ships 
15 88.2 57 67.9 26 65.5 19 17 117 45.2 
Bulk 
Carrier 
0 0.0 2 2.4 5 10.9 53 47.3 60 23.2 
Refrigerated 
Cargo Carrier 
0 0.0 6 7.1 9 19.6 6 5.4 21 8.1 
Passenger  
Ships 
1 5.9 1 1.2 0 0.0 9 8 11 4.2 
Ro-Ro 
ships 
0 0.0 8 9.5 1 2.2 2 1.8 11 4.2 
Oil Tanker 
 
0 0.0 3 3.6 0 0.0 6 5.4 9 3.5 
Container 
ship 
0 0.0 1 1.2 0 0.0 7 6.2 8 3.1 
Chemical 
Tanker 
0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.2 7 6.2 8 3.1 
Other 
 
1 5.9 6 7.1 4 8.7 3 2.7 14 5.4 
 
 
Table 2: Indicates that the highest detention rate was for general cargo ships (45.2%) 
and the low detention rates were for containers ships, tankers and passenger ships, 
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which reflect the proper implementation of the code on board vessels where the 
high-risk cargoes are transported. Also, it should be noted that most of the 
detentions related to USCG compared to other MOUs, reflecting more strict security 
regulation in this region.  
 
The provision of regulation XI-2/9 of SOLAS and part A of the ISPS Code make the 
vessels inside the foreign port or intending to enter foreign port subject to control 
and need to be able to show valid International Ship Security Certificate (ISS) as 
well as relevant security records. The vessels which fail to demonstrate compliance 
with the ISPS Code will be denied entry and they will be subject to “additional 
enforcement measures”, which may be stricter For example, the USCG has 
indicated that its port state control program reflects the compliance history of all 
vessels, flag state administrations, and recognizes security organizations. This 
history is stored in electronic and documentary form to use when making P.S.C 
decisions regarding the enforcement action to take for vessels has commercial 
interests with U.S.A ports (Yilmazel & Asyali, 2005). 
 
This statistics indicate satisfactory level of implementation of the ISPS Code in a 
relatively short period. However, most of the main problems in the implementation 
process seems to be related to the personnel performance such as access control 
procedures, inadequate Master/Ship Security Officer familiarity with overall Ship 
Security Plans, inadequate crew familiarity with the ISPS roles and responsibilities, 
inadequate monitoring of ship’s security reliability, sub-standard attitude and 
awareness, and lack of enough experience and training of ships’ crew about the 
ISPS code (Yilmazel & Asyali, 2005). 
 
2.10. ISPS Code and container security  
 
The ISPS Code is an international agreement providing methodology of addressing 
security threats and managing potential risks that ships and ports may face in the 
international trade. IMO has provided the matter by introducing global minimum 
standards and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism. Individual governments can 
use these as a basis for expansion as appropriate to increase the level of security 
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according to the recent threat. In addition, the co-operation among world wide 
countries will have meaningful impact in reducing and preventing maritime criminals. 
For example, container security is a complex system and exchange of real time 
intelligence and updating information among all countries will have prevention 
measures against container criminals including terrorist attacks.  
 
Meanwhile, security is not a static issue as threats changes from time to time. 
Governments need to monitor changes and offset them, as they occur, by 
communicating proper information and guidance to ships and port facilities to 
increase awareness and prompt response. Security of the containers needs the 
fastest, effective and efficient security systems especially when the container is 
passing to the port area where the ISPS Code is implemented. Using the technology 
and global cooperation will introduce the best solution to obtain this aim by 
inspecting, tracking and securing the containers without disturbance to the 
containerization trade pattern.   
 
2.11. Conclusion   
Maritime security can only be achieved with the commitment of all stakeholders to 
implement the ISPS Code in a uniform way. In situations where not every nation 
implements this Code effectively, there is bound to be lapses in security. But the 
ISPS Code should not be considered as an end to security problems. Vigilance is 
required of all.  
 
Security should start by awareness on the dangers of terrorist acts and port 
authorities should take appropriate measures to reduce opportunities of any 
containers to be hijacked or becoming Trojan horses. Often these opportunities are 
so far “provided” with the help of port authorities due to lack of vigilance or 
negligence. 
 
Just as technology can be said to be advancing, maritime terrorism is advancing as 
well considering the changes in forms of terrorist acts and the sophisticated nature 
of their acts. The advent of internet has led to most terrorist organizations to easily 
gain advanced information that helps them perpetrate their acts. 
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Chapter 3 
Container security and technology 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The study through the previous chapter shows the gaps and weaknesses in the 
intermodal transportation system, which maybe used by terrorists. Meanwhile, 
considering the importance of using the technology to secure the container 
transportation system and since it is expected that this strategy will become the 
international security strategy for ships and port facilities. Therefore, it is of great 
importance to study the aspects of the various types of technology that could be 
used to secure the container movement and cover the gaps in the transportation 
chain from its origin point to its final destination. 
 
In order to get fastest, most effective and efficient way to secure the containers in 
the intermodal transportation system, technology is the solution to integrate the 
security system together with the ISPS Code. Container security has improved 
gradually in the last few years, in reaction to the event of September 11. The world 
now establishes a risk management system to identify potential high-risk containers, 
and automate that system. This system should introduce the smoothing of the 
container movement in all steps and allow inspection of all containers as early as 
possible in the ports of origin. 
 
All countries towards this issue are now making a great effort especially from the 
United States. Many proposals were introduced to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to take action in order to increase not only the container security 
but also the entire containerization system such as port security in terms of 
container terminals, container vessels and container companies. But, the problem in 
the container security as an intermodal system is that some areas are beyond the 
scope of IMO such as the security measures to be applied for shippers and 
container packers to secure the real content of the container. Therefore, other 
organization such as World Custom Organization (WCO), and International Labour 
Organization (ILO) should take an important part in the container security. 
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3.2. Cargo security at the point of origin  
 
The point of origin is the point where the container starts being stuffed by the cargo 
in the exporter’s factory passing through land transportation mode then the port area 
till shipment on board the vessel in the country of origin. Security during these steps 
is necessary because inspecting cargo on board vessels on the high seas is almost 
impossible and inspecting cargo upon its arrival at destination port could be too late 
to prevent a terrorist event. Containerized cargo is a relevant example to that issue 
because the containers are stuffed and sealed at the exporter’s factory. Ensuring 
that the container was not stuffed with illegitimate cargo, not tampered while trucked 
to the port of loading, and ensuring that the cargo details reported is not fraudulent, 
is all critical challenges in supply-chain security. Therefore, confirmation of security 
of each transport facility and the reliability of every company involved in the 
intermodal shipping process are important (Congressional Research service (CRS), 
2004).  
 
3.2.1 Security at originating shipper premises  
 
Shippers and carriers play a fundamental role in justifying the potential illegal cargo 
from entering the containers within the supply chain. Once the container is stuffed 
on the shippers’ premises, it will be immediately sealed to prevent any tampering 
with the container contents after its complete loading. The shipper will start to issue 
his documents to indicate the description of the container contents including the 
container and seal number and identification code. Then it will be loaded on trucks 
or railroad bounding to the port area for shipment.  However, sometimes the 
warehouse facilities may have weak controls and personnel practices. For instance, 
access to shipping areas may not be secure and warehouse personnel practices 
may lack sufficient background or identity checks. Also, the seals types which are 
used to lock the container doors may provide minimum security tampering. 
Therefore, many proposals and new technology are now intended to push the 
shipper performance towards more efficient and effective security at this stage of the 
container inermodal transportation chain (OECD, 2004).  
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3.2.2 Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)   
 
The C-TPAT is a voluntary government business initiative proposed by the U.S, 
intended at building “co-operative relationships that strengthen overall supply chain 
and border security”.   The basic concept of that agreement is to making supply-
chain participants, such as shipper and carriers, responsible for putting the best 
security performance of cargo transportation through implementing processes for 
the packing, tracking and distribution of all containers and goods in the intermodal 
layers (Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 2006). 
 
 The program includes recommendations and guidelines to be followed by the 
parties after signing cooperation agreement. For instant, the recommendations will 
require the shipper to provide basic physical security for all building and 
transportation access areas and it may also required this building to be constructed 
of materials that are resistant to unlawful entry. The carriers are also required to 
make visual inspection inside the empty containers before being loaded, and ensure 
that high security electronic seals are fixed on all containers. Moreover, all 
companies work in the system should have documentary procedure for their 
employees to screen their identification and background of each one according to 
his work type and the sensitivity of the position (Sweet, 2006, p. 176).    
 
Once the agreement has been confirmed between parties, they are expected to 
show their ability to comply with the C-TPAT recommendations and guidelines. 
However, no more liability for non compliance party but the U.S. customs may 
remove this party from the C-TPAT membership which means stop all its 
commercial interest with the USA which may cause damage to his business (CBP, 
2006). 
 
Concerning the effects of C-TPAT on the intermodal supply chain, the program 
improves efficiency through implementation practices and standards of parties in 
containers transportation layers. It is also may make it more difficult for smugglers 
and terrorist organizations to use the container shipment for their illegal purposes.  
However, it does not make any clear prevention measures through the supply chain 
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security and does not help reduce the probability of successful attack or any 
compensation measures when theft or terrorism occurs (Willis & Ortiz, 2004).  
 
3.2.3. The technology of the container seals 
 
Most present container seals are mechanical devices that are categorized into 
indicative, security, and high security seals. Those types of seals are generally 
providing evidence or indication to the authorities if there is illegal entry or tampering 
with the container contents through the transportation chain. But, mechanical seals 
are easy to defeat while the expert thief or terrorists could cut the seal and replace it 
by a similar unit after they complete their crime. However, security seals could 
overcome this weakness by having unique identification number and being marked 
by the seal owner’s stamp. For example, the U.S coast guard has changed the 
shipper seal to new one that should mark with an “alphanumeric identifier, which 
consists of five digits related to the port code, followed by a sequential number, 
(BALMS 00064)” (USCG, 2005).     
 
The mechanical seals are only useful when joining cargo documents such as bill of 
lading or manifest, which indicates what was inside the container when it was sealed. 
Therefore, the seals should be fixed on the container on jointly attendance of direct 
responsible persons such as shipper and customs representative to verify visually 
the container contents before it is sealed. For more effectiveness, farther information 
about the seal should be kept by authorities in a special log book such as date and 
time of each visual inspection, ID number of the container and transportation unit, 
name and rank of inspector and name/ title of witnesses. This information will be 
useful to identify where the container was breached on the transportation chain and 
who is responsible (USCG, 2005).  
 
The electronic seal is a new technology device that has physical security and 
information management capability. The electronic seal is similar to the mechanical 
seal with an additional smart chip to be able to record all the information data related 
to the container and its contents as an “electronic cargo manifest”. The seal is also 
able to send its recorded message using Radio Frequency (RF) or infrared (IR). 
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Some advanced types transmit data through the Global Positioning System (GPS). 
This message will be sent automatically in time of any illegal tampering with the 
container that makes the authorities be able to identify the risky container location 
(OECD /ECMT, 2005, p. 53). 
 
From a financial point of view, the use of the electronic seals today as part of the 
global container chain is difficult; this is mostly because of economic considerations. 
The effective system for e-seals should consists of an enormous number of reading 
devices/scanners, computer hardware and an outfit of fundamental information 
management software systems capable of accurately processing the seal data. 
These requirements may be deployed and effectively managed by some large ports 
or some big companies, but it is quite difficult for the small individual companies and 
small ports especially in some developing countries (OECD / ECMT, 2005, p. 54).         
 
However, the advanced technologies of Radio Frequency Identification Tag (RFID) 
have several advantages, including relatively low price and proven operational 
capability. RFIDs are classified as passive or active. The passive type is cheaper 
and its power supply comes from a reader or scanner that make its use limited to 
relatively short distance, but it is read only and affixed by the party stuffing the 
container to track its movement through various transportation modes. An active 
seal has independent power supply that makes it able to record more events and 
transmit through greater distance. This tag is read/written that would provide the 
supply chain by more data of the container contents. In both types (passive or active) 
the tags can be read by RFID readers through the transportation chain and provide 
information on the exact location of the container. These readers could also identify 
the ID of the container being transported. Communication to the office through a 
wireless LAN, the location of any vehicle or container can be automatically recorded 
and displayed (Lukas, 2004, p. 18).  
  
Standards for RFID tags used with container seals are also being discussed by 
institutions, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and 
International Telecommunication Union – Radio-communication (ITU-R), as the aim 
is to agree upon radio frequency that can be used internationally for that purpose. At 
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the present time, standards exist only for mechanical container seals and passive 
RFID tags which are considered mandatory for all containers imported to the USA. 
The ISO codes for electronic container seals using RFID tags currently being 
developed is (ISO/DIS 18185) (OECD / ECMT, 2005, p. 56).    
 
Concerning the effects of container security seals on the transaction of the 
intermodal system, it might increase detection capabilities at the port of origin of 
transport of any illegal cargo, which reduces the potential damage as well (Willis & 
Ortiz, 2004). However, the system does not increase the supply chain efficiency in 
case of “Trojan horse scenario” where illegal cargo is stuffed on the container before 
the sealing process. That may occurs by any person working in a legitimate position 
such as stuffing persons at the shipper premises and being involve at the same time 
with illegitimate organizations such terrorists or smugglers.          
 
3.3. Tracking the container 
 
As mentioned before, the e-seals improve the security of the intermodal containers 
through alerting the authorities in case of any illegal interference to the container or 
its contents. Another advantage is the tracking and tracing function to identify the 
location of the container or the transport unit within the transportation chain. Once 
the containers stuffed and leave the shipper premises to start the transportation 
journey, its route should be previously planned. If the control centre of the tracking 
system is reported of any such deviation in the container routes or opening of the 
container door without previous permission and before reaching its final destination, 
it will be sequentially notified to local authorities to take security action. Cargo-
tracking systems could be particularly well suitable for ensuring that in-transit 
cargoes do not fall into the wrong hands and are not diverted from their legitimate 
route, whether through simple theft or territories such as in case of “Container 
Hijack” or swap of an illegal imports cargo for a legal one through the legitimate 
trade pattern such as the case of “Trojan horse” (James & Robert, 2002). 
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Figure 4: Tracking on shippers premises through WLAN or GSM and internet 
 
 
Several varieties of technology are available to track containers. To decide which 
technology is suitable for such transportation mode will depend on the geographic 
scope for the tracking. In the case of the relatively limited area such as land 
transportation rail/road and port area, and in container terminals, the best 
technology will be the RFID tags with bar codes for each container or its seal, and 
set of readers and scanners in many different positions to cover all the container 
movement. Scanners can read codes from almost any direction and the portable 
scanners allow workers to read bar codes anywhere. In the case of long distance 
movement such as maritime transportation and some kind of land transportation 
through the borders between countries, the best way of tracking is satellites through 
the Global Positioning System (GPS). The technology of the GPS is available to be 
used for civilian purposes and have worldwide coverage.  This system need satellite 
transponder to be fixed on the container to communicate with GPS to generate the 
updated position of the container to the ground station, which is consequently 
connected with the GPS satellite (Balog, 2005).  
 
Concerning the effect of the RFID technology on security of the intermodal system, it 
has significantly increased the supply chain efficiency while the shipper and carriers 
are able to see where the weaknesses occur in their supply chain and could 
potentially optimize coverage of the gaps in the shipping process. Early detection of 
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misrouted or illegal goods will reduce the costs of theft and lost goods. Detection of 
any tampering with container contents at the port of origin will reduce damage of 
terrorist crimes. While, RFID is not able to identify the causes of the effects, it will 
improve the supply chain resilience if quick response is taken to reroute shipments 
in case of any disaster (Willis and Ortiz, 2004).   
Figure 5: Tracking through land transportation mode 
 
 
Tracking the containers on board vessels is considerable secured that is because 
the maritime mode is the only the mode that has an international security regime 
presented by the ISPS code. IMO has done a great effort to secure the ships cargo 
on board as well through navigation overseas. Regulation (19), paragraph 2.4, 
chapter V, 74 as amended and MSC 76 requires carriage of Automatic Identification 
system (AIS) on all ships of over 300 gross tonnages engaged on international 
voyages. The AIS is a navigation system installed on ships that automatically sends 
the ship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigation status, and other safety 
related information to other ships and shore-based agencies, to allow for ship 
tracking and monitoring by the Vessel Traffic System (VTS) located in each port.  
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Figure 6: Tracking at maritime sector transportation using INMARSAT system  
 
 
Concerning a Ship Security Alert System, IMO has adopted regulation (6) chapter 
XI-2 of SOLAS, 74 as amended during the diplomatic conference in December 2002. 
This regulation that came into force in July 2004 requires ships of over 500 gross 
tonnages to be equipped with an alarm system in order to strengthen ship security. 
This system allows the crew, in case of danger, to activate an alarm button that 
automatically sends a message to the ship owner and to competent authorities. The 
message is sent without being detected by someone on-board or by other ships in 
the area. These requirements with the addition security measure have been taken 
by the shippers or carriers to track the container itself while boarding on such 
vessels at sea. The GPS transponder has the ability to send its message to the 
authorities through satellite communication in case of any illegal tampering with the 
container at sea travel. Consequently, the authorities will take additional inspections 
for such containers in the port of arrival. 
       
3.4. Security at port area  
 
Once the container arrives to the port gate, it is time to leave the national security 
regime and lies under the international security regime of the ISPS Code and other 
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additional measures taken by some countries through cooperation agreement to 
maximize the security for the intermodal transportation. As an extension of the 
tracking system, the technology of Optical Character Recognition (OCR) will be 
applied starting from the terminal gate. Also the technology of scanning, screening 
and 24 hour rules will be implemented. This technology is part of the U.S. proposal 
named Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 to extend its security 
border to the foreign ports of origin including transit ports.  
 
3.4.1. ISPS Code in action 
 
The ISPS Code requires ships to provide pre-arrival information before arrival to the 
port approach area. This information to be supplied should at least include: ISPS 
identification certificate; operating security level statement; a statement of any 
additional security measures required; a statement of any previous security action 
taken against the ship or any other special measures and history of at least last 10 
ports of call. Any delay to submit such information to the Port Security Officer (PSO) 
on such mentioned time may delay or prevent the vessel to be allowed to enter this 
port. Once the vessel is inside the port, port security guidance should be announced 
to all persons concerned such as crew on board. This information includes access 
control, restricted areas, cargo handling operations, monitoring of ship security and 
interaction with port facilities.   Therefore, the one big consequence of not complying 
with the ISPS Code for ships is that a ship can be denied access to a port, which in 
turn means that it interrupts the carriers' schedule and causes delays in the cargo 
deliveries. This delay may maintain major costs to the carrier and the risk of lost 
business (SOLAS, CH. XI-2, regulation 9, 2004, p. 448-451). 
 
3.4.2 Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
 
The system consists of a group of cameras positioned on the gates of the container 
terminal, which is divided into lanes. Each lane allows for one truck only to pass 
through; other groups of cameras are spread inside the area of the terminal 
including the rail and yard operations, and others are fixed on the loading cranes. 
Those groups of cameras have different criteria to take images for the container, as 
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a video, and connected to the software to make all systems available at any time 
from any place. The system has many benefits, which are: based on tracking the 
container to provide quick classification of the object, the system eliminates false-
identification resulting from other tracking device, computerized tracking and 
screening system eliminates manual interference of traffic at gates. In addition, the 
OCR gives more benefits such as calculating the real-time for computerized 
operations and improved security response, makes more facility in order to have 
smooth flow of containers, ensures that the container does not pass any security 
check point, and makes files for the images which may be used for security 
confirmation. In other words, the OCR system will make it easy to make container 
tracking management in the terminals in terms of more accuracy tracking, increase 
the terminal capacity, reduce terminal staffing requirements, and the images files will 
assist for any further inspection (Elovic, 2003). 
 
3.4.3 Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
The driving force behind the CSI is to “push the border back” in an effort to secure 
containers at the point of origin before shipment in order to identify the high-risk 
container as early as possible to prevent containerized cargo from being an easy 
terrorist target. The U.S. has addressed their security concerns to have agreement 
with countries, which have a direct or indirect trade relation with them. In the 
beginning, the U.S. custom office focuses on 20 major ports around the world, 
where more than 70% of U.S. trade passes through. At the present time the number 
of contracted ports is 44 around the world (CBP, 2006).  
 
The following data states that 44 CSI ports are currently operational from the date of 
contract. They include: “Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, Canada (03/02); 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands (09/02/02); Le Havre, France (12/02/02); Marseille, 
France (01/07/05); Bremerhaven, Germany (02/02/03); Hamburg, Germany 
(02/09/03); Antwerp, Belgium (02/23/03); Zeebrugge, Belgium (10/29/04); Singapore 
(03/10/03); Yokohama, Japan (03/24/03); Tokyo, Japan (05/21/04); Hong Kong 
(05/05/03); Gothenburg, Sweden (05/23/03); Felixstowe, United Kingdom (U.K.) 
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(05/24/03); Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, U.K. (11/01/04); 
Genoa, Italy (06/16/03); La Spezia, Italy (06/23/03); Livorno, Italy (12/30/04); Naples, 
Italy (09/30/04); Gioia Tauro, Italy (10/31/04); Pusan, Korea (08/04/03); Durban, 
South Africa (12/01/03); Port Klang, Malaysia (03/08/04); Tanjung Pelepas, 
Malaysia (8/16/04); Piraeus, Greece (07/27/04), Algeciras, Spain (07/30/04), 
Nagoya and Kobe, Japan (08/06/04), Laem Chabang, Thailand (8/13/04), Dubai; 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (03/26/05); Shanghai (04/28/05), Shenzhen (06/24/05); 
Kaohsiung (07/25/05); and Santos, Brazil (09/22/05), Colombo, Sri Lanka (09/29/05), 
Buenos Aires, Argentina (11/17/05), Lisbon, Portugal (12/14/05), Port Salalah, 
Oman (03/08/06), and Puerto Cortes, Honduras (03/25/06)” (CBP, fact sheet, 2006). 
 
The container security initiative (CSI) consists of the following four elements:  
• The system depends on the use of the automated information to identify and 
target the high-risk containers through use of advanced information.  
• Pre-screening those containers to identify which are high-risk at the foreign 
CSI port before arriving to the U.S. ports.  
• Using detection technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers 
including radiation detectors and large scale x-ray imaging equipment to 
carry out inspection as quickly as possible and without any delay of 
legitimate cargo. 
• Using smarter, tamper-proof containers. The elements explain if the 
container has been tampered with after security screening (CBP, 2006). 
 
3.4.3.1. 24 hours rules  
 
First, using automation information to identify and target high-risk containers or what 
is known as the “24-Hours Rule”. The system, which started on December 2, 2002, 
requires carriers to provide the ship cargo manifests by submitted electronically to 
U.S. Customs before cargo to load on board by 24 hours destined for the U.S. ports. 
The rule is also valid for the empty containers and transit containers which are 
called “Foreign Cargo Remaining on Board (FROB)”; however, bulk shipments are 
exempted from this requirements and break bulk cargo exceptions may be made on 
a case-by-case basis (UNCTAD, 2004).  
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Manifests vary by transportation mode but they generally contain information about 
the shipper, consignee, carrier, country/port of origin, and description of cargo. This 
will make the Custom and Border Protection authorities very closely linked to the 
shipment contents including timing of each cargo movement from one mode to 
another. It also, establishes new policy for the container shipments: adding new 
criteria to U.S. customs service automated system, which indicates the latest 
information about any terrorist action, to be sure that the manifest is reviewed by 
experts. Finally, it tracks the container in case the system identifies any risk or 
dangerous container. This electronic cargo information is used for the importation 
into or exportation from the United States (CBP, 2005). 
 
The system of 24 hours makes the carrier responsible for any failure to provide 
manifest information or failure to present or transmit accurate and complete manifest 
data in the required time or transmission of any false, forged or altered document. 
He may be liable for civil penalties. Moreover and for security reasons, the U.S. 
custom office has decided not to release information from cargo declarations until 
the complete manifest is filed with them and the information may be published after 
the vessel has completed loading and leaving the foreign port. The efficiency of the 
24 hour rule requires the carrier to be accurate, fast and efficient to sending the 
required information without any delay. It also depends on the efficiency of the 
Customs Office experts to quickly analyze the received information in order to be 
able as quickly as possible to assign the high risk cargo and send the message “not 
to load” to the carrier without any further delay for the legitimate cargo (UNCTAD, 
2004). 
 
3.4.3.2. Screening and scanning technology 
 
Second, the pre-screening system uses a combination of large-scale x-ray, gamma 
rays machines and a global positioning transponder. The manual process of 
opening, discharging, and physically inspecting a container takes approximately 8 
hours and may be more, which depends on each individual case, while the manual 
inspection can cause significant delays of cargo flows. This technology will help to 
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make quick inspection for the containers without any delay of the normal flow of the 
trade. The system has different capabilities to identify specific materials such as 
explosives, radioactive material, drugs and any kind of weapons. Different kinds of 
equipment may be used for that purpose such as crane mounted, hand-held, and 
mobile. The pre-screening will be in the port of origin and before 24 hour at least of 
the container shipment on board the vessel (CBP, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Scanning the container before shipment and screening picture. (Source: Bureau 
International des Containers) 
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The ability of the inspection equipment, even with the latest updated technology, is 
limited and detection of materials relies on the experience of the operators. An X-ray 
machine could detect the material by examining its density and give alert through a 
sound alarm (see figure 7), but the final decision about what kind of material it is 
exactly will depend on the screen operator’s judgment while viewing the image and 
sometimes physical inspection is needed. Therefore, inspectors need to be well 
trained to understand the x-ray images. However, table 3 will summarize the 
inspection technology which is used for the security functions (OECD/ECMT, 2005).    
 
3.4.3.3 Technology to identify high risk container 
 
Third, the US custom service takes more steps to identify and target the high-risk 
containers; this system applies to both countries using CSI and non-CSI ports. The 
system introduced a new form of vessel manifest to be used in the system called 
Sea Cargo Targeting Initiative, which is a computerized system to identify high-risk 
containers, and it establishes a new policy for shipment toward US ports. The 
Initiative has three main components: to add new technology to the US service 
computerised system to have the updated information about possible terrorist 
actions; to be sure that all the available information will be passed to expert persons 
to review it and make standard system for US customs in all the ports and trained 
for how to handle the action when the system indicates high-risk shipment (Jagc, 
2003).  
 
3.4.3.4 Improvement in electronic seals 
 
Finally, the US customs service has also taken advanced steps to improve the 
electronic seals as an alerting system for any tampering of containers after they 
have been screened. The alerting system is a motion detection or light detection 
used to warn of anybody trying to go through the container contents by bypassing 
the seals. Some containers today already have this system for example; refrigerated 
containers in use today contain a smarter device to maintain the temperature to 
avoid the melting of the meat. US custom service has taken more steps to inspect 
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the containers by using gamma rays in some kind of machines in order to allow the 
inspectors to inspect the containers within 90 second whether they are empty or 
loaded with cargo. This machine will be used for in- bound and outbound containers 
in US ports and also in other partner ports where the CSI system is applied (Jagc, 
2003). 
 
3.4.4 Underwater surveillance  
 
Using technology for securing port infrastructure is extended to the under water area 
to combat any possible attacks by terrorist divers. The system is designed to track 
and observe underwater threats in order to give alarms for authorities to act on. The 
way is to use Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), which is normally used to inspect 
the underwater hull of the vessels or protect navy vessels. ROV is a robotic system 
for underwater operations, which differs in size and configuration. Different types 
and a number of cameras, mechanical tools, sonar and sensors support the robot. 
Some harbors in the USA and Europe have implemented this system for security 
issues in commercial harbor areas, either by using the same kind of hull inspection 
robot or by using fixed underwater installations. Benefits include increased 
protection of ports, critical waterside infrastructures and other fixed shoreline sites 
and prevention of attacks affecting large areas of local populations such as those 
near dangerous cargo areas such as gas and oil terminals. The advantage of this 
system is to discover any risk of terrorists without negatively impacting a port’s 
capability to operate and free movement of the vessels (Ferriere, 2005).        
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Table 3: Technology features. (Source: European Conference of Ministry and 
Transport (ECMT) report, 2005, p.50).  
 Description  Indicates 
potential 
presence 
of threat 
Provides 
material 
Discriminate-
-ion 
Time for 
inspection 
Installation Cost 
Active systems 
Acoustic An ultrasonic transducer is 
put into the container and 
a sensor detects the 
reflection and forms an 
image 
Yes, in 
liquids 
No Portable/deskt
op equipment, 
which can be 
operated by 
battery or wall 
plug power 
$$ 
Gamma 
ray 
The gamma rays interact 
with the object and are 
displayed as an image 
Yes No 
 
 
 
2-5 minutes/ 
object 
$$$ 
Pulsed 
Fast 
Neutron 
Analyses 
(PFNA) 
Pulsed neutrons are 
directed at the object and 
create gamma rays with 
energies characteristic of 
its elemental composition 
Yes yes $$$$ 
Thermal 
Neutron 
Activation 
(TNA) 
Sophisticated sensors 
detect the energy of the 
gamma ray photon emitted 
when the thermal neutron 
is absorbed by material 
within the object 
Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
90+ 
minutes/ 
object 
$$$ 
X-ray  
Standard 
transmiss-
-ion 
The transmission of x-rays 
is directed through the 
cargo to a detector and 
presents one 
“shadowgram” image to 
that overlays all items in 
the beam path 
Yes No $$$/$
$$$ 
Dual 
energy 
transmiss-
-ion 
Two different x-ray energy 
spectra are used. 
Generally ineffective for 
large cargoes 
n.a. Not in high 
density 
cargoes 
n.a. 
Dual view 
transmiss-
-ion 
Two views of the object 
are displayed 
Yes No $$$$$ 
Backscatt
er with 
transmiss-
-ion 
Two or more views are 
displayed. Backscatter 
images highlight items in 
the object that contain low 
atomic number elements 
Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2-5 minutes/ 
object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile, fixed 
or relocatable 
sites. Fixed 
and 
relocatable 
sites require 
local 
infrastructure 
of power, road 
access, 
personnel 
facilities and 
attention to 
radiation 
safety  
$$$$ 
Passive system 
Canine 
use 
Dogs are trained to alert 
the presence of explosives 
and other threat objects 
Yes Yes Requires care, 
feeding and 
shelter, 
together with 
trained 
handlers 
$ 
Radiation 
detection 
A detector measures the 
ionizing radiation or other 
characteristic radiation 
emitted from a radioactive 
substances 
Yes Yes $ 
Trace 
detection/ 
vapour 
detection 
A “sniffer” types sensor 
collects and analyses air 
samples  
Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5-1 
minute/ 
object 
Portable/ 
desktop 
equipment, 
which can be 
operated by 
battery or wall 
plug power 
$ 
Cost key: $ ≤ $ 50, K;$$≤ 100 
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
Technology is available to secure the intermodal transportation chain in term of 
container transport. Using this technology could cover many gaps and weaknesses 
in the container transportation system. The cooperation agreement among most of 
the industrial countries gives validity for emerging the system in the international 
security regime. The system could also take further steps to improve the 
management procedure and identify the responsibilities among shipping actors. 
 
However, this technology alone cannot achieve effective security. The people works 
on the field, especially in land mode, is another important factor could affect the 
level of protection such as the availability to interfere the container contents at 
shipper premises and before the container start its legitimate journey.   
 
Moreover, the efficiency of the system mostly depends on its effective 
implementation on the country of origin where there is different customs and 
practices varied from one country to another.   This technology will not be effective 
without international agreement and harmonization for the system together with the 
ISPS Code.  
 
Decision makers should be aware of the benefits and impacts of their decision to 
implement this technology such as: 
• How this technology will be used? 
• Who will pay for its cost? 
• The impacts for their country if such implementation take place, 
• Detailed cost benefit analysis for tightness security measures and its impacts 
to the other industries, 
• The international market situation in term of the demand and supply theory, 
• The effect of this implementation, especially these initiatives which depends 
on bilateral agreement on their countries sovereignty.   
 
Most of these analyses are subject for economic consideration and the discussion 
through the next chapter may help to better understand some of these factors. 
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Chapter 4 
Security control and economic impact 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to donate to a better understanding of the impact of the 
new security measures on the maritime community. The chapter will introduce the 
cost analysis for implementation of mandatory IMO security measures related to 
ships and port facilities. The cost analysis will also include the cost of American 
Initiatives, its effect on the shipping industry and try to answer the question of “who 
will pay for the security”. The chapter will bring in the cost of terrorist attacks take 
into consideration some real examples and opinion of industrial experts. The cost 
benefit analysis will be discussed to give attention to the benefits and impacts of 
tight security measures on industrial actors.            
 
Shipping plays a vital role in the economy of world trade and maritime transport is 
an economic activity. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) estimates that the operation of merchant ships contributes about 
US$380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, equivalent to about 5% of 
the total world trade (IMO, 2005). The concept of the shipping business that every 
player on the field need to gain, but sometimes-unavoidable factors may affect this 
environment. The September 11 event gives attention to the world of possibility of 
using transportation facilities in the terrorist act. Quick action has been taken to 
increase security, which appears in mandatory implementation of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code as chapter XI-2 in SOLAS convention. 
Additionally, the United States and European countries proposed tighter security 
initiatives considering the intermodal transportation system includes various modes 
of transportation.      
 
New security improvement will require expensive infrastructure and technology. The 
costs arising from terrorist attack are huge including loss of lives. A decision should 
be taken by the maritime community and industrial actors to save the international 
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trade and world economy. Cost analysis is the way from an economic point of view 
for such decision.  
 
4.2. Cost analysis in intermodal security 
4.2.1. Direct and indirect costs 
 
Cost of intermodal transportation security can be classified as either direct or 
indirect. Direct costs are the capital costs, which are needed to build security 
framework such as:  
• costs of  purchasing new security equipments to prevent any terrorist 
activities and protect the fixed physical infrastructure (e.g., terminals, 
warehouses, supply chain),  
• cost of implementing new security regulations,  
• cost of employing new security staff and increase their awareness through 
sustaining education and training procedures.  
 
Indirect costs are the operational costs that need to update the system to cover any 
security gaps, which may arise during the work such as:  
• maintenance of the equipment, 
• increase efficiency of the supply chain through increased management 
density, 
• cost of responding to a terrorist event (communication, collect information, 
central distribution system),  
• cost related to consequences of management recovery including recovering 
from interrupted operations and re-constructing.  
 
4.2.2. Cost of implementing security measures 
 
The cost affecting ship-operators to enhance maritime security will be in two areas, 
namely shore side and on board vessels. In general the cost will include 
documentation transaction to and from other involved parties, such as port 
authorities, increased communication, personnel training shore side / on board 
vessels, increase labour, using standard devices and security-related technology. 
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Some other factors will affect the cost level depending on the types of vessels they 
operate. For example, the costs will increase for vessels entitled to flag of countries 
involved in additional security agreements, such as container vessels proceeding to 
US ports require additional devices for the ship and its cargo.  The vessels that do 
not apply to these requirements will not be able to enter any U.S ports, which mean 
great economic losses for the ship operators.  
 
For security concerns, all ships involved in international trade are required to be 
equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS), ships identification number, 
and ship security alert system. These requirements were agreed by the Maritime 
Safety Committee 76, and become mandatory for all vessels from July, 2004 as 
SOLAS requirements in Chapter XI-2. However, AIS requirements were already in 
place in chapter V of SOLAS for the purpose of safety of navigation. Concerning 
container vessels, U.S Container Security Initiative (CSI) requires additional 
equipment for tracking and anti-tampering devices such as Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID), Global Positioning System (GPS) with special characteristics, 
96 hours notification of arrival and 24 hour advanced manifest rules.   
 
For the purpose of this study, the number of world fleet vessels will be needed to 
estimate the cost of security implementation on board sea going vessels. According 
to IMO statistics in its international day meeting for carriers of world trade 2005,  
The current world trading fleet was made up of 46,222 ships, with a 
combined tonnage of 597,709,000 GT. The vast bulk of the fleet was 
made up of: general cargo ships (18,150), tankers (11,356), bulk 
carriers (6,139), passenger ships (5,679) and containerships (3,165). 
Other ship types accounted for 1,733 vessels. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the estimated cost calculations for both international 
requirements (SOLAS / ISPS code) and United States maritime security measures. 
The contents of table 4 were obtained from IMO data, industrial sources, United 
States Coast Guard (USCG), and Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD) report 2003. Calculations were based on the average price of 
each device up to the current market price. The actual number of world fleet vessels 
used in the calculation was based on vessels more than 500 G.T and involved in 
international trade, 43 291 vessels as corresponds to Lloyd’s Register estimation.   
 
Table 4: Summary cost of maritime security and non Anti-terrorism Benefits. (Source: OCED 
report, 2003, P.55) 
 
Measures Initial cost 
approximate 
(million USD) 
Yearly Cost 
approximately 
(million USD) 
Indirect cost Confidence 
level 
Non 
terrorism 
benefits 
IMO SOLAS/ISPS Code 
Government Security 
Alert Levels 
(Low) N/a Potentially large Low + 
Automatic Identification 
Systems 
649.3 (Undetermined) Undetermined High +++ 
Ship Security Alert 
System 
86.5 4.3 0 High  
Ship Identification 
Number 
216 n/a 0 Medium + 
Company Security 
Officer  
(large companies) 
514.6 514.6 Undetermined Medium + 
Company Security 
Officer  
(small companies) 
150 150 Undetermined Low + 
Ship Security 
Assessment 
103.9 (Low) 0 Medium  
Ship Security Plan 51.9 (Low) 0 Medium  
Ship Security Officer 29 29 0 Medium + 
Ship Security 
Training/drills 
16.8 16.8 0 Medium  
Vessel Security 
Equipment 
304.4 15.2 0 High + 
Record-keeping (Low) (Low) 0 High  
Port facility Security 
Assessment 
27.9 8 0 Low ++ 
Port facility Security 
Plan 
27.9 8 0 Low ++ 
Port facility Security 
Officer 
Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined  ++ 
Port facility 
Training/drills 
Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined  + 
Port facility Security 
Equipment/staff 
Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined  +++ 
United States Maritime Security measures 
Maritime 
Transportation Safety 
Act of 2002 (non- IMO 
provisions) 
(Undetermined) (Potentially large) (Undetermined)   
96-hour Advance 6.7 6.7 (Undetermined) High  
INS Crew Seafarer 
Requirements 
(proposed) 
95 (at least) (Undetermined) High Low  
24-Hour Advance 
Manifest Rule 
281.7 
To 
10 000 
281.7 
To 
10 000 
(Undetermined) Low ++ 
Container Security 
Initiative 
(Undetermined) (Undetermined) (Undetermined)  + 
Customs-Trade 
Partnership against 
Terrorism 
(Undetermined) (Undetermined) (Undetermined)  +++ 
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4.2.2.1. Cost of IMO, SOLAS/ISPS Code, mandatory regulation 
 
As it shown in table 4 above, the initial cost estimated to be spent by ship operators 
to comply with the ISPS Code is at least USD1.3 billion and USD730 million per 
year thereafter. However, the cost related ISPS code implementation for port 
facilities seems to be larger. The OECD confidence level in their judgment of some 
costs varied, especially with costs related to many US initiatives. That is basically 
because these initiatives have fewer technical elements and have a potentially 
border and more disperse effect. The confidence level is higher in the IMO 
measures targeting companies and ships than other IMO measures targeting ports 
and many of the US initiatives. Some undetermined data will be observed because it 
depends on how each country will handle the case or otherwise there will be lack of 
experience on future maintenance price to some systems (OECD, 2003, P.54). 
 
Figure 8: ISPS Code implementation costs.  (Source : OECD, 2003, p.38). 
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4.2.2.2. Estimated cost of United States maritime security measures 
 
Concerning the cost of the American proposals, the Department of Homeland 
Security has an appropriate budget of USD4.2 billion for port, container and cargo 
security. However, this budget is not enough in the opinion of the American port 
safety advocates, such as Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., and Port of Seattle Chief 
Executive Mic Dinsmore. Murray said, “Those funds are not enough and that is why 
we ask for more”.  He also added that “ports need the kind of hardened security now 
present at the airports, and that the cost of doing so far exceeds the bill's budget for 
it”. The estimation budget should include USD2.1 billion for Coast Guard port 
security operations, USD1.7 billion for Customs and Border Protection cargo 
inspection and trade operations, USD139 million for a Container Security Initiative, 
USD178 million for radiation portal monitors, USD70.1 million for a Customs Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism, and USD200 million in port security grants (Bolt, 
2006, p.1). 
 
4.3. The economic impact due to successful terrorist attack 
  
In the maritime sector, the volume of world trade conducted by sea was estimated 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to be 5.8 
billion tons traded by sea. This account for over 90% of the world trade by volume 
and contributes about USD380 billion in freight rates within the global economy, 5% 
of total world trade (World Maritime Day, 2005). The impact of any coordinated 
terrorists attack will have significant effect start from industrial users; extending to 
individual country economy and the entire world economy as well.    
 
A coordinated terrorist attack against a port could result in shutting down the entire 
system and disturb the government organization. This may also extend to disturb all 
transportation modes serving this port. The economic impact of such incident will be 
huge and will affect the country economy. For example, in the United States one of 
the Government Senators called Levin Coleman made a study to estimate the 
economic consequences of an attack on the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. 
This study found that the United States’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would 
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decline by about USD150 million per day for each day that the ports were closed 
and that the annual cost would be approximately USD70 billion (Coleman, 2006). 
 
Another real example, when a group of terrorists attacked Limberg tanker on 
October 2002 while at anchorage at Yemen Port. This incident increased the 
insurance premium three times more for the vessels calling Yemen ports as much 
as USD0.3 million and the premium for the 20-foot container reached USD250. 
Terminal operations dropped from 43 000 TEUs to 3 000 TEUs in three months only. 
Many shipping lines changed their routes and schedules to Yemen, which had a 
negative impact on the country’s industry. About 3000 jobs were lost on Yemen port. 
Governments estimated losses of USD15 million per month, which negatively 
affected the Yemeni 2001 GDP by 1% if this situation continued for complete year 
(Jain, 2004). 
 
The attacks on the World Trade Centre resulted in massive economic losses on the 
United States. The consequences were huge in the entire transportation industry, 
especially airlines due to the closing of the American air space for four days. 
Approximately 200 000 jobs were destroyed or transferred out of New York, another 
reason is that lower Manhattan lost approximately 30% of its office space and 
scores of businesses disappeared.   The damage on the physical infrastructure 
suffered losses of USD14 billion for private businesses, USD15 billion for state and 
local government enterprises and USD0.7 billion for the federal government. 
Additionally, the great losses for world wide insurance companies due to the terrorist 
attacks were estimated up to USD58 billion to pay liability insurance (OECD, 2003). 
 
Another study shows the impact on Japanese economy based on scenario of 
terrorist incident affecting the waterway around Japan. The experts estimated the 
losses for the Japanese economy in case disturbance or prevention of shipments of 
crude oil from the Middle East to Japan by USD88 million if the Malacca / Singapore 
Strait were blocked, USD200 million if the South China Sea were closed, and 1.2 
billion if the Indonesian Archipelagic Waters become impassable. The estimation of 
these losses was not only for Japan but also for many other countries in the area. 
This is because the blocking of these waterways will make freight bound for them 
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detour around south coast of Australia. The European countries and the US will also 
suffer from economic losses from such estimation due the disturbance of container 
trade with Southeast Asia’s countries and Japan. In other words, the disturbance of 
container shipment will impose serious losses on the world economy. The delay of 
transportation of raw materials and industrial elements transported by container will 
inflict stoppage of many factories and projects, which will affect the entire world 
economy (Akimoto, 2001, p. 8-9). 
 
4.4. Cost benefit analysis    
 
While implementation of security measures is costly, consequences of terrorist 
attacks are more costly and while some measures may slow trade, many others can 
in fact lower trade cost. The benefits of tight security measures mainly have 
economic aspect for countries and for the entire world trade. Apart from economic 
gains, the major benefit that should be considered is tighter security measures will 
prevent or at least decrease losses of life resulting from any successful terrorist 
attack. Loss of life could be by direct killing with weapon of mass destruction or with 
long run killing affecting people’s health by chemical, biological or nuclear weapon.  
 
The benefit express the revenue from invested the money in such previous control 
option per each unit to avoid or minimize the risk. Stakeholder is vital element in this 
step, which they can affect the decision because they have more commercial 
interests therefore the decision should be equitable and fair to all stakeholders. To 
obtain the objective, the risk balance is developed to calculate the gain of the new 
implementation. In other words, they should found that return benefits and effective 
risk reducing it more than cost investment and the present situation of risks. For 
example, how much the investment costs to allow the port authority to check the 
condition of the container before loading on board in term of time cost in the 
operation schedule of the vessel to avoid the crises results from terrorist action. Also, 
the investment costs for education and training of the crew on board in front of the 
results to increase security awareness. The decision maker should consider the 
capital cost for implementing the new regulations, communication costs, operation 
costs, labour and training costs, maintenance, inspection and certification costs. On 
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the other hand they evaluate the benefits in term of prevent the implication of 
terrorist attack and its further consequences such as reduce damage for human and 
environments.  
 
Additionally, the economic benefits for tighter security are tremendous and will 
increase in long run operations some of which them may appear with the following 
examples: 
• All the industrial actors will gain benefits from decreasing cargo theft and 
pilferage, lowered insurance premium, reduced delays, and faster 
processing times, improve inventory control and decreased documentation 
routine due to improved information technology. For example, the cost 
benefit analysis of a new automated cargo manifest estimates direct saving 
to American importers only by USD22.2 billion over 20 years and saving 
USD 4.4 billion for the American government over the same period (OECD, 
2003, p.56).  
• Increased security would have an impact on reducing stowaways and illegal 
cargo trafficking such as drug smuggling that kills more people and has bad 
effects on society over time.  
• The government will be able to identify cargo which had previously 
counterfeit or misidentify with gaining exceed USD2 billion. 
• The government will be able to gain USD16 billion from tobacco tax alone 
that had previously traded by illegal way. 
• Protect the marine environment from damages through detecting 
undeclared, improperly described and improperly load of dangerous cargo 
and nuclear materials (Trelawny, 2006).   
  
4.5. Various economic considerations 
4.5.1. Who will pay security costs? 
 
The American initiatives to improve container security request all foreign countries 
that have commercial interest with United State to implement the CSI program in 
their ports. U.S Customs intend to pay to arrange their officers and computers in the 
foreign ports, but other costs related technological equipment such as screening and 
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detection equipment will be paid by the host port. Most of the countries recognized 
the importance of trade with U.S started to addressing question of (who will pay for 
this expensive technology?). Many of the decision makers are still confused that the 
cost will be covered by relevant host ports or by way of public funding (i.e. exporter, 
importer, shipper, carriers or any other party) (UNCTAD, 2004). 
 
The trend of maritime communities indicates that the consumer will pay the cost of 
security. The cost for the container will increase about USD7 for screening and 
implementing other container security measures (U.S. Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation, 2005). The government will primarily pay for 
security implementation and then this cost would be passed to the users such as 
shippers and carriers, and finally this cost would be passed to consumers of goods 
or in other words to the public community. This concept is clear in the speech of Mr. 
Tim Blood, manger director of P & O ports in Australia and New Zealand, who said 
“the Federal Government expected the shipping industry to bear the security cost 
but the community did not realize this would inevitably mean higher prices for 
consumer goods”. He added, “Importers and exporters would be hit with increased 
costs that would be passed on to consumers” (Russell, 2004). 
 
In the 2nd Annual U.S Maritime security Expo and Conference, October 2003, many 
speakers gave their opinion about how security costs should be covered. Mr. 
Thomas Thune Andersen, Maersk representative, enhanced the importance of co-
operation between governments and the industry partnerships to identify measures 
that would be effective in this matter. He also stated addressing security,” Progress 
has been made, but much work still lies ahead and no single entity can do it alone”. 
Another speaker at the same conference was Mr. Michael Connors, of Booz, Allen, 
Hamilton, said that the solution is to seed money for technology development in 
maritime security and the only way for that is increased costs to consumers because 
in one way or another they will pay for it (Babul, 2004). 
 
However, The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) announced the 
importance of the ports in the nation’s economy and declared that additional fees 
and taxes upon ports are unacceptable. They said that the maritime community 
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already pays billions of dollars in user fees and taxes to the federal government. 
This money is considered as federal revenues, which include USD17.5 billion from 
customs duties and should be used as a source of security funds (American 
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), 2006). 
 
4.5.2. Impact on developing countries  
 
While the costs of security implementation are expensive and the level of technology 
and equipments required to comply with the new security measures is not easy to 
establish, developing countries may suffer some implication to cover either the direct 
or the indirect costs of security. The huge competition in the shipping market and the 
limited ability of small entities, such as ports, carriers, shippers, and intermediaries 
comparing with the same parties in the developed countries will make participation 
of the developing countries in international trade is difficult. Potentially, the legitimate 
trade may be negatively affected, due to the incapacity of principally small and 
medium size enterprises within these countries, to effectively comply with the new 
requirements. For example, the CSI program proposed by the US will be difficult to 
implement by some small developing countries because the cost per port for that 
program varied from USD1-5 billion (UNCTAD, 2004, p.20). 
 
In the developing countries most of the industry businesses are related to 
government operations such as ports and fleet operations. Private sectors are very 
limited for specific types of jobs such as shippers, forwarders and agency. These 
private sectors are also related to the government in their final job procedures like 
documentation and customs process.  Therefore, most of the load to cover the 
security implementation will lie on the government, which should get part from the 
nation economy. These deductions from the national economy will be the strategy in 
the exports and imports and increase the price of goods for the public consumers as 
well.  
 
On the other hand if some countries take medium solution by implementing only the 
mandatory (IMO – SOLAS/ISPS Code) part of the security measures and decline 
the other optional part which lies under U.S. initiatives, as an option to save some of 
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these costs, they will face a problem of limited international trade because most of 
the exporter and importer will prefer to transport their cargo through ports and 
shippers which they apply to the US initiatives to avoid any stoppage or delay for 
their trade. These will show up the problem of bilateral agreements which may 
divide nations into favoured and less favoured trading partners and may lead to 
competitive disadvantages and failure to participate of developing countries in the 
international trade market.     
 
Decision makers should be aware of the opportunity cost theory, which is one of the 
most suitable economic theories that should apply to developing countries and 
problems of security implementation costs. This theory simply explains `Who needs 
the others and there must be decisions on what will be done and what is left undone, 
what service will be provided and what not provided? `. In other words, the shipping 
market is a competitive market and if one country did not accept any rules, which 
generally apply to other countries, this country will be only the looser because it will 
be out of the market. There fleet will suffer many stoppages by the port state control 
detention or decline allowing to enter some ports. Shippers and exporters will suffer 
great losses due cargo delay in pay of huge demurrages to compensate cargo 
owners and finally they will loss the existing in the market.         
 
Moreover, technological devices which are required by the container security system, 
such as electronic seals and smart container system will need the availability of 
suitable equipments, electricity supply, technical assistance, maintenance schedules, 
and experts’ operators. These requirements are a problem of many developing 
countries at this time to apply with the rules and will increase the risk on the 
exporters to participate on the competitive international trade (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 
25).     
 
4.5.3. Impact on shippers 
 
Shippers have a responsible role in implementation of security measures as 
mentioned before, as they are considered the major actors in security of the point of 
origin through intermodal transportation, such as installing tracking and anti-
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tampering devices in the containers. The European Commission gives priority to 
create transport security in depth through the logistic supply chain and it is apparent 
that very soon it will be reality. The European Shipper Council (ESC) paper on “The 
Impact of Security Regulation and other Requirements on Shippers” has analysed 
and estimated the effects of the additional security requirements on shippers that 
will be discussed below.    
 
Generally, shippers consider the cost of compliance with security regulations like 
any other business and this cost will simply be recovered from their customers. 
However, the ESC registered many cases where shippers were suffering more cost 
than they were expected to due to long delays to their cargo movements caused by 
U.S. customs authorities. These delays some times recorded two weeks and they 
were mainly caused by carrying out stricter screening and other security procedures. 
The shippers announced that they had to pay the cost of demurrage in addition to 
the liability consequences of some cargo damage and loos of some customers 
because they were unable to deliver the cargo on time (ESC, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, shippers are also suffering from fluctuating costs of the market, 
especially in the liner market, such as container shipping being more competitive 
than the other markets. The demand is (e.g. container vessels, shipper offices) 
present in the market more than the supply (e.g. export and import cargo). Then the 
rule of price elasticity will apply in this case particularly for the demand sector (Shou, 
2005). 
 
This means that the shipper should decrease transportation freight to continue 
combating on the market or otherwise if the customers find another cheaper way, 
they will take it. In that sense, shippers will suffer two opposite directions of the 
market completion: 
• Shippers should increase freight rates to cover the cost of new security 
measures, especially U.S. requirements in intermodal transportation. 
• At the same time shippers should decrease the freight as the liner market is 
a competitive market and supply is more than demand in the recent time. 
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Table 5: Fluctuations in container freight rates in the major East-West trades. (Source: 
Containerization International, various issues). 
 
Qtr/Year Asia/US 
Eastbound 
US/Asia 
Westbound 
Europe/Asia 
Eastbound 
Asia/Europe 
Westbound 
US/Europe 
Eastbound  
Europe/US 
Westbound 
Q2 2003 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Q3 116.19 101.16 104.33 106.50 98.59 103.14 
Q4 110.19 94.08 98.95 105.86 90.26 104.93 
Q1 2004 107.75 93.15 96.19 107.39 84.20 102.64 
 
Table 5 shows fluctuation of the market freight price and it also shows the difference 
in of the freight price for the same cargo coming from the US and bound for the US. 
For example, in the first quarter of 2004 the freight price for the cargo bound east 
from U.S to Europe will cost 84.2 while the same cargo bound west from Europe to 
the US cost 102.6 which means extra fees in the US bound cargo including the fees 
and taxes of the security measures and expected delay of cargo in security 
procedures (shipping Australia limited, 2004). 
 
The 24-hour rules required by American customs expressed extra cost on shippers 
stemming from the early manifest requirements. While the security rules stated that 
only shipment data is required 24-hours before loading, some ports did not accept 
this data without existence of the cargo in front of port inspectors themselves. 
Therefore, shippers are paying extra cost for port space for containers shipped in 
advance one or two days before loading on board the vessel. Additionally, some 
carriers require shippers to send this data for them even earlier so that they should 
also transmit this data to the American customs as part of the carrier requirements 
(OECD, 2003, p.48). 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
While the security implementation is costly, the economic losses due to any 
successful terrorist attack will be badly. The cost of implementing container security 
stay under two categories: the first is the cost related to IMO-ISPS Code 
implementation which is estimated to be around USD 1.3 billion as a direct cost and 
730 million as indirect or operational cost. The second is cost related to implement 
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the new container initiatives which is undetermined for many port because it is 
depends on the level of technology will be used. However, the American studies 
shows that this cost may arise up to USD 4.5 billion for port.  
 
The cost of successful terrorist attack is tremendous due to its further implication on 
human lives physically and psychologically. The attack may cause losses of lives 
and keep its impact to the environment for long period. It is also affect the nations 
and international economy and keep them suffering to recover over long term period. 
 
The cost benefits analysis resulting that the cost which nation will spend on increase 
security over the transportation chain will consider finally gain of money to all the 
industrial actors. Gains will include protect the trade from thief, illegal trade, 
fraudulent cargo, illegal immigration, and improve communication technology in term 
of saving time in the normal documentation procedure that had been used before. 
 
Developing countries may suffer some implication to cover either the direct or the 
indirect costs of security. The huge competition in the shipping market and the limit 
ability of small entities, such as ports, carriers, shippers, and intermediaries 
comparing with the same parties in the developed countries will make participate of 
the developing countries in international trade is difficult. Potentially, the legitimate 
trade may be negatively affected, due to the incapacity of principally small and 
medium size enterprises within these countries, to effectively comply with the new 
requirements. The bilateral agreements may divide nations into favoured and less 
favoured trading partners and may lead to competitive disadvantages and failure to 
participate of developing countries in the international trade market.     
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Recommendation 
 
5.1. Conclusions   
 
The research through the security framework of the international transport chain and 
intermodal container system provided theoretical and analytical viewpoints on the 
estimated weaknesses in the different modes of transportation, the most promising 
solution to enhancing security, and the economic consideration for the new security 
measures. The solutions presented for improving security are encouraging for the 
purposes of protecting the national and international interests including protection of 
human lives and provide a safe economic environment for the world. 
 
Transport authorities face great challenges to cover the weaknesses of the 
intermodal system under their jurisdiction. One the most difficult challenge is that 
there is no single system governing the international movement of the container 
from its point of origin to the final destination. While, the international security 
framework exists at the centre of the chain covering ports and maritime transport, 
under supervision of SOLAS and the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS), there is not yet an equivalent framework to cover the outer edges of 
the system, such as land and inland waterway transport. 
 
Many of the security breaches in the container transport chain may be established at 
the land mode where there are possibilities of tampering with the container contents. 
Two possibilities may be addressed: 
- The first is the Trojan horse scenario, which depends on setting up or 
purchasing staffing inside the legitimate trading companies that allow the 
criminals to achieve their illegal purpose through the normal trade patterns. 
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This may happen at the shippers’ premises when stuffing the container 
contents. 
- The second is hijacking the containers when the terrorist are targeting a 
legitimate container and tampering with its contents at any security weak 
step during its voyage. 
Once the container is at the port, there is another challenge for the port authorities 
to namely identify whether this container is previously hijacked or Trojan horse. Port 
authorities applied only the requirements of the ISPS Code, which is not able to 
cover the security weaknesses at the land mode. The real example for that is the 
continual existence of piracy, ships hijack, and stowaways’ problems.  . Recognizing 
stowaways’ problem, where the most cases are reported in containers, also gives 
great awareness of the terrorist problem due to the possible accessibility to the port 
area by unauthorized persons, indicating the weak implementation of the ISPS Code 
in some maritime countries and its inability to cover the breaches in the intermodal 
container system. 
 
However, the statistics from the port state control in 2005 related to the ISPS Code, 
non- compliance ships classified by ships types indicate that the container ships 
have the lowest detention rates among other ship types. This may point to the 
proper implementation of the code on board these vessels after the code come into 
force, but it also signifies that most breaches come from the shore side area 
whether it is in land mode or at the port area. 
 
The intermodal container industry requires a solution, which does not delay the flow 
of commerce but significantly improves the security of the system. Many initiatives 
are in place as a first step for the overall solution. These initiatives try to employ the 
advanced technology to cover the gaps in the container chain. The system proposed 
provides further steps to improve the management procedure and identify the 
responsibilities among shipping actors. 
 
The initiatives introduced devices to track and trace the container from the point of 
origin by introducing the electronic seal and RFID tags which they activate 
automatically and send signals to the authorities in case of any try to tampering with 
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the container content through the entire transportation chain. These devices are 
working with radio frequency to cover the land area and with satellite frequency as 
well to cover the maritime sector. But, in land mode it needs many readers to 
support the system. On the gate of the ports scanning and screening for the 
container will be carried out to check the container contents and identify the high risk 
containers. Anti- tampering devices will continue their function at the transit time at 
the port storage area. 
 
Concerning improvement of the security management system, shippers are 
requested to be held fully responsibility for the container contents and send this 
information automatically through the automatic cargo manifest to the customs 
authorities 24 hours before the cargo is loaded on board. The carriers are also 
requested to hold the responsibilities of any unknown deviation from the normal 
trade route and send notification of arrival by enough time to the port of arrival 96 
hours requested by the US ports. 
 
The technology is available to cover the gaps. However, this technology alone can 
not achieve effective security. The people working in the field, especially in land 
mode is another important factor that could affect the level of protection, such as the 
availability to tamper with the container contents at shipper premises and before the 
container starts its legitimate journey. 
 
Moreover, the efficiency of the system mostly depends in its effective 
implementation on the country of origin where there is different customs and 
practices varying from one country to another. This technology will not be effective 
without international agreement and harmonization for the system together with the 
ISPS Code. 
 
In that sense, the security of intermodal transportation system cannot depend on the 
ISPS Code only because the code is not “Cure-all” and it is a starting point to show 
the right way to the entire industry in the same direction. The Intermodal 
transportation chain needs an international regime to cover the system from its point 
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of origin to the final destination because it will be easy to find form where the 
deficiencies start to understand the requirements of each country. 
 
Decision makers should be aware of the benefits and impacts of their decisions to 
implement this technology such as: 
• How will this technology be used? 
• Who will pay for its cost? 
• The impacts for their country if such implementation take place, 
• Detailed cost benefit analysis for tightness of security measures and its 
impacts to other industries, 
• The international market situation in terms of the demand and supply theory, 
• The effect of this implementation, especially the initiatives that depend on 
bilateral agreement under their countries sovereignty. 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTCAD) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimate that the operation of merchant 
ships contributes about USD380 billion in freight rate within the global economy. 
More than 90% of the world trade in volume transported by sea moves by containers. 
The world fleet made up 46 222 ships, including 3165 container vessels, transfer 
nearly 250 million containers annually between countries. Most of the dangerous 
cargo, such as chemical, nuclear, biological, and radioactive material moves in 
containers. These figures give an indication of the great importance of the 
intermodal container shipping to the world trade. 
 
Container security is essential to protect this industry and the world economy.  While 
the implementation of security measures is costly, consequences of terrorist attacks 
are more costly and while some measures may slow trade, many others can in fact 
lower trade costs. Additionally, there are more cost benefits resulting from increased 
security in the transportation chain, namely gain of money to all the industrial actors. 
Gains will include protecting the trade from theft, illegal trade, fraudulent cargo, 
illegal immigration, and improved communication technology in terms of saving time 
in the normal documentation procedure that was used before. 
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However various impacts may face the industrial actors and the country of origin to 
implement the new security measures. The most affected actor will be the shipper 
and the most affected countries will be the developing countries.  The international 
market is a competitive market, particularly in the liner shipping such as the 
container shipping. The theory of demand and supply will control the market, which 
means that the actors, who will able to provide cheaper services, will be able to 
continue in the competition. Therefore, the shipper will face two opposite problems: 
first to contribute to the security requirements interim of the additional cost and 
second to try to maintain the freight charges within the normal limit of the market. 
 
All the industrial experts estimate that the governments will pay the security costs 
and additional taxes will be collected from the actors such as carriers and shippers. 
Consequently, the actors will increase the freight rate on the exporters and 
importers, and finally the normal costumers, or in other words the public citizens in 
each country, will bear these costs in terms of more expensive commodities in the 
domestic market. 
 
Developing countries may face some implications to apply with the new security 
measures. This is mostly because the small number of the industrial enterprises that 
are able to cover the security costs and the huge competition in the international 
trade market. The new security measures proposed by the US depend on the 
bilateral agreements that may some countries sign and others not sign.  These may 
divide nations into favoured and less favoured trading partners and may lead to 
competitive disadvantages and failure to participate of developing countries in the 
international trade market.     
 
Shippers and carriers will also face some difficulty in the flow of their trade due to 
the expected delay to deliver the cargo in case of tightness security procedure at 
some CSI Ports. Identification of high-risk container by scanning systems may delay 
the flow of the trade and make the shippers bay compensation for the cargo owners 
due to time delay. In some developing countries shippers also suffering problems of 
implementing the CSI, which lead the exporters to choose another port, comply with 
the rules to load their freight to avoid any further problems on the ports of arrivals.  
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The ocean carriers may also suffer the problem of time delay if they are comply with 
the requirement by refuse their entry to the ports or facing further unfavoured delay, 
which may lead to loss chartering contracts and lost trust of the users .      
 
5.2. Recommendations  
 
The stakeholders and transportation authorities must co-operate to address the 
various issues correlated to improve intermodal security and reduce the vulnerability 
to a terrorist attack using the cargo container and transportation chain. The role of 
responsibilities among the transportation authorities must be defined. This will be 
appropriate with using the risk management plane to organize the work and avoid 
the duplicating or overlapping of responsibilities. Stakeholders should increase the 
co-operation between the private and public sectors of transportation facilities, as 
any weakness in system, either private or public, will affect the level of protection for 
the entire system. These plans should be under continuous supervision by the 
national governments to ensure updated response according to the international 
criminal situation in the transportation system. 
 
The transportation authorities should carefully identify the efficiency of the supply 
chain under their domestic legislation and focus on removing the weaknesses, 
particularly on the outer edges of the intermodal transportation system.  This will 
lead to improving the entire security system and prevent risk transfer from one mode 
to another, which will give positive results in the effective implementation of the 
ISPS Code in the maritime sector. Referring to what was mentioned earlier in 
chapter 2 of this study, the container may become a Trojan horse or hijacked during 
any gaps in the land transportation mode. So, providing more security awareness in 
the shippers’ premises, and within land transportation carriers, will decrease the risk 
factors through the entire intermodal transportation. It is recommended to establish 
a strict employment system to know the history of each worker, establish security 
education and training programs, increase security awareness among the workers, 
monitor the work done by more than one supervisor, and update the workers´ 
knowledge according to the current international threat.  
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In the port area transportation authorities should ensure effective implementation of 
the ISPS Code in terms of establishing strict controlling access to the port area, 
monitoring port employees, monitoring stevedoring companies and their employees, 
and establishing stricter security measures around the vessels in their terminals.   
 The national governments should also supervise the level of the ISPS Code 
implementation on the national ports and fleet. The voluntary flag state audit 
enhanced by the IMO is a good opportunity for each country to ensure its 
compliance with the international regulations including the security measures. 
Increasing the national fleet compliance will decrease the time stoppage for their 
vessels due to the detention by the foreign Port States Control which will encourage 
the ship-owners to register their vessels under this flag and will lead to more 
economic gains to this flag.    
 
Increasing the security funds is one successful solution considering that security is 
normal business in the shipping industry. Using the technology to secure the system 
may use these funds to increase the level of protection. For example, the existing 
cameras in and around the working area will introduce more protection levels and 
make it easier to discover any unauthorised persons or illegal action by the 
authorized workers.  Intermodal transportation stockholders should also consider the 
cost benefits that will be gained from security improvement in terms of lower 
insurance premiums, cargo loss prevention, increased tax revenues, and improved 
supply chain management system. It is recommended to the decision makers that 
technology should take place in the container security system and that it is not 
necessary to provide a very high level of technology, which is expensive, but it is 
important to use the budget available to cover all the gaps that are determined 
through the transportation system.   
             
International action is required in terms of working group operation among IMO, 
International Labour Organization (ILO), and World Custom Organization (WCO) to 
establish a security form for the intermodal transportation system. International 
standards on transparency and identify responsibilities for the parties involved with 
or having commercial interests in the ships or ports. There should be some 
measures to evaluate the security performance on the shippers, agencies, and 
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stevedoring companies. In this sense, IMO should be an active contributor in 
developing a container security system in terms of tracking, screening, and 
identifying the high risk containers.  The system should be under an international 
forum to create a form, which is suitable for all member states. This new 
international regime may be based on: 
- Identifying the technology required to cover the gaps of container security 
from the point of origin to the point of destination with minimum costs to be 
available for each country to contribute to the system. 
- The system could identify the availability of the technological security 
devices in the international market to ensure coverage of the existing 
worldwide containers and existing entire world container vessels fleet. 
- The system could also include guidelines for the users in terms of its 
technical establishment, regular maintenance, training courses, availability of 
the spare parts, and experts’ opinions.   
 
 
International security agreements between the shipping countries that outline ways 
that these countries will assist each other on advancing information on vessels, 
crews, cargo and indicators of which cargo items have already been inspected in 
various ways. These agreements should have an international forum under the 
supervision of a United Nations agency, such as IMO. The working example on the 
horizon is the piracy problems, where IMO requires all flag states to report the 
current incidents and then reporting back the cases to the world fleets. These gives 
progressing in handling this problem by identifying the dangerous areas at sea and 
advising the vessels how to navigate through these areas to avoid pirate dangers. In 
this sense, the shipping countries could co-operate to inform each other of the 
probability to stowaways; high-risk containers or any terrorist threat.  This fast 
communication and co-operation will enhance the quickly preparation and response 
to this risk, which may prevent or at least minimize the danger that may exist.  
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